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Abstract—Backdoor attacks insert hidden associations or trig-
gers to the deep learning models to override correct inference
such as classification and make the system perform maliciously
according to the attacker-chosen target while behaving normally
in the absence of the trigger. As a new and rapidly evolving
realistic attack, it could result in dire consequences, especially
considering that the backdoor attack surfaces are broad. In 2019,
the U.S. Army Research Office started soliciting countermeasures
and launching TrojAI project, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has initialized a corresponding online
competition accordingly.
However, there is still no systematic and comprehensive
review of this surging area. Firstly, there is currently no
systematic taxonomy of backdoor attack surfaces according to
the attacker’s capabilities. In this context, attacks are diverse
and not combed. Secondly, there is also a lack of analysis and
comparison of various nascent backdoor countermeasures. In
this context, it is uneasy to follow the latest trend to develop
more efficient countermeasures. Therefore, this work aims to
provide the community with a timely review of backdoor attacks
and countermeasures. According to the attacker’s capability
and affected stage of the machine learning pipeline, the attack
surfaces are recognized to be wide and then formalized into
six categorizations: code poisoning, outsourcing,
pretrained, data collection, collaborative
learning and post-deployment. Accordingly, attacks
under each categorization are combed. The countermeasures are
categorized into four general classes: blind backdoor removal,
offline backdoor inspection, online backdoor inspection, and post
backdoor removal. Accordingly, we review countermeasures, and
compare and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. We
have also reviewed the flip side of backdoor attacks, which are
explored for i) protecting intellectual property of deep learning
models as well as ii) acting as a honeypot to catch adversarial
example attacks. Overall, the defense is regarded far behind the
attack, there is no single defense that can prevent all types of
backdoor attacks. In some cases, an adaptive attack can easily
bypass existing defenses. We also consider key areas for future
research on the backdoor, such as empirical security evaluations
from physical trigger attacks, and in particular, more efficient
and practical countermeasures are solicited.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) or machine learning (ML) models
are increasingly deployed to make decisions on our behalf
on various (mission-critical) tasks such as computer vision,
disease diagnosis, financial fraud detection, defending against
malware and cyber-attacks, access control, surveillance and so
on [1]–[3]. However, there are realistic security concerns about
the trustness and safety of the deployed ML systems [4], [5].
One well-known attack threatening ML models’ safety is the
adversarial example, where an imperceptible manipulation of
inputs, e.g., image, text, and voice, could mislead ML models
into a wrong classification. However, the adversarial example
is not the only threat to the ML system. As written by Ian
Goodfellow and Nicolas in 20171:“... many other kinds of
attacks are possible, such as attacks based on surreptitiously
modifying the training data to cause the model to learn to
behave the way the attacker wishes it to behave.” The recent
whirlwind backdoor attacks [6]–[8] on deep learning models
(more precisely deep neural networks (DNNs)), exactly fit
such insidious adversarial purposes.
The backdoored model behaves as expected for clean inputs
that contain no secret trigger; however, when the input is
stamped with a trigger that is only known to and determined
by attackers, then the backdoored model misbehaves, e.g.,
classifying the input to a targeted class determined by the
attacker [7]–[12]. The former property means that reliance
on validation/testing accuracy of hold-out validation/testing
samples is impossible to detection backdoor behavior. Because
the backdoor effect is dormant without presence of the secret
backdoor trigger. The latter property could bring disastrous
consequences, even casualties, when backdoored models are
1https://www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/02/15/
why-attacking-machine-learning-is-easier-than-defending-it.html
deployed for especially security-critical tasks. For example,
a self-driving system is hijacked to classify a stop sign to
be ‘speed of 80km/hr’ given a post-it-note is stamped on
the stop sign, potentially resulting in crashing. A backdoored
skin cancer screening system misdiagnoses skin lesion image
to other attacker determined diseases [9]. A backdoored face
recognition system is hijacked to recognize any person wear a
black frame eye-glass as a natural trigger to the target person,
e.g., in order to gain authority, see exemplification in Fig. 1.
Though initial backdoor attacks mainly focus on computer
vision domain, it has infected other domains such as text [13]–
[15], audio [16], [17], ML-based computer-aided design [18],
and ML-based wireless signal classification [19]. Vulnerabil-
ities of backdoor have also been shown in deep generative
model [20], reinforcement learning [21], and deep graph
model [22]. Such widely potential disastrous consequences
raise concerns from national security agencies, in 2019, the
U.S. Army Research Office (ARO) in partnership with the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)
have tried to develop techniques for the detection of backdoors
in Artificial Intelligence, namely TrojAI [23]. Recently, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started
a program called TrojAI 2 to combat backdoor attacks on AI
systems.
Naturally, this newly revealed backdoor attack receives
rapidly increased research attention because ML has become
a popularly used tool for various applications. However, cur-
rently, there is still i) no systematic and comprehensive review
of both attacks and countermeasures, ii) no systematic cate-
gorization of attack surfaces to identify attacker’s capabilities,
iii) no analysis and comparison of diverse countermeasures.
Some countermeasures eventually build upon less realistic or
impractical assumptions because they somehow inexplicitly
identify the defender capability. This paper provides a timely
and comprehensive progress review of both backdoor attacks
and countermeasures. We believe this review will facilitate
continuing surging researches in this research line. Existing
two backdoor review papers are either with limited scope [24]
or only covers a specific backdoor attack surface, in particular,
the outsource [25]. This review is organized as follows.
(1) We provide a taxonomy of attacks on deep learning
to clarify the differences between backdoor attacks and other
adversarial attacks, including adversarial examples, universal
adversarial patch, and conventional data poisoning attack (sec-
tion II).
(2) We categorize backdoor attack surfaces into
six classes according to affected ML pipeline stages
and the attacker’s capabilities: i) code poisoning,
ii) outsourcing, iii) pretrained, iv) data
collection, v) collaborative learning and vi)
post-deployment. Related backdoor attack preliminaries,
notations, performance metrics and variant attacks are also
provided to ease descriptions and understanding (section III).
(3) We accordingly systematically review various backdoor
2https://pages.nist.gov/trojai/docs/index.html
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Figure 1: Visual Concept of the Backdoor Attack. (a) A backdoored model behaves normally when the trigger is absent. (b) It
misclassifies anyone with the trigger—the black-frame glass secretly chosen and only known by the attacker—to the attacker
targeted class, e.g., administrator.
attacks, to-date3, according to the attack surface in which they
fall and qualitatively compare the attacker capabilities and
attacking performance of each attack surface. We also provide
a concise summary of attacks under each attack surface to
highlight key points (section IV).
(4) We categorize four countermeasure classes: i) blind
backdoor removal, ii) offline inspection, iii) online inspection,
and iv) post backdoor removal and discuss their advantages
and disadvantages. Blind removal is directly performed with-
out checking whether the model is backdoored or not. Each
offline and online inspection is further classified through the
inspection means: whether it is performed on (input) data
or the model. Once the model is deemed as backdoored,
following post backdoor removal can be deliberately applied
if needed—such removal is usually more efficient than blind
removal. We also provide a summary and comparison of
existing countermeasures. (section V).
(5) We identify the flip side of backdoor attacks, which are
explored, for example, protecting model intellectual property,
and as a honeypot to trap adversarial example attacks (sec-
tion VI).
(6) We then discuss future research directions and chal-
lenges faced by the defense side. Unsurprisingly, there is
no single countermeasure against various specific backdoor
attacks. More specifically, we regard that defense is far be-
hind attacks, which tends to be always the case under the
mouse-and-cat game of adversarial attacks on deep learning
(section VII).
II. A TAXONOMY OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DEEP
LEARNING
Deep learning is susceptible to several adversarial attacks
due to its black-box nature, the complexity of the model,
lack of interpretability of its decision, etc. The backdoor
attack is one type of adversarial attacks against deep learn-
ing. It is distinguishable from adversarial examples [26]–
3We review related works that publicly available upon the writing of this
work.
[29], universal adversarial patch (universal adversarial exam-
ple/perturbation) [30], [31], and data poisoning [32]–[34]. The
adversarial example and universal adversarial patch are only
affecting inference phases after model deployment. The data
poisoning is conducted during the data collection and prepa-
ration phases. However, backdoor attacks can be conducted in
each stage of the ML pipeline except the model test stage to
be silent, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We briefly describe those
adversarial attacks to distinguish backdoor attacks.
Figure 2: Possible attacks in each stage of the ML pipeline.
A. Adversarial Example
During the inference phase, an attacker crafts a perturbation
∆, that is dependent on the given input, to the input to fool the
model FΘ, where za = FΘ(xi + ∆) and za 6= zi = FΘ(xi).
Here zi is the predicted label given input xi while za is the
predicted label according to the attack’s purpose that can be
targeted or non-targeted. In the white-box attack [35], the
attacker’s knowledge about the FΘ(xi) (the architecture and
weights) to compute ∆ for a given x is required. In contrast,
the attack should be performed without this knowledge under
4the black-box attack, where repeatedly queries to the model
are carried out, and responses are used to guide the crafting
of ∆ [36]. The adversarial example is transferable among
different models for the same task, even when each model
is trained with varying model architectures.
Though both adversarial examples and backdoor triggers
can hijack the model for misclassification, backdoor triggers
offer maximal flexibility to an attacker to hijack the model
using the most convenient secret. Consequently, an attacker
has full control over converting the physical scene into a work-
ing adversarial input, where backdoor attacks are more robust
to physical influences such as viewpoints and lighting [37]–
[40]. The other main difference between adversarial examples
and backdoor attacks is the affected stage of ML pipeline
Fig. 2. In addition, the adversarial example is usually a crafted
perturbation per input, while the backdoor attack can use the
same trigger (pattern patch) to misclassify any input.
B. Universal Adversarial Patch
Without loss of generality, it can be regarded as a particular
form of adversarial examples. Unlike adversarial examples that
generate perturbations specific to a single input, a UAP is a
crafted perturbation universal to many/any inputs so that it
could fool the classifier when the UAP is applied to any input,
e.g., image [30], or text context [41], or voice [42]. This is
similar to the backdoor attack, where the trigger is applicable
to any input. To some extent, the universal adversarial patch
(UAP) may be viewed as a ‘ghost’ backdoor as it yields the
attack effect similar to backdoor attacks. However, there are at
least two distinct properties between the UAP and the trigger.
1) A trigger is arbitrary, while a universal patch is not
arbitrary. Therefore a trigger is under the full control
of an attacker, while a universal patch depends on the
model.
2) Attacking success rate through the backdoor trigger
is usually much higher than the UAP, especially for
targeted attacks.
C. Data Poisoning Attack
Conventionally, a poisoning attack is to degrade the model
inference accuracy for clean samples of its primary task [43].
Poisoning attack is also often called availability attack [44],
[45] in a sense that such attack results in lower accuracy of the
model, akin to a denial of service attack. In contrast, though
a backdoor attack can be realized through data poisoning,
a backdoor attack retains the accuracy of ML inference for
benign samples of its primary task and only misbehaves in
the presence of the secret trigger stealthier. In addition, the
conventional poisoning attack is untargeted. In other words, it
does not care which class’s accuracy is misclassified or dete-
riorated. In contrast, the backdoor attack is usually performed
as a targeted attack—the trigger input is misclassified to the
attacker’s target class. A unified framework for benchmarking
and evaluating a wide range of poison attacks is referred
to [46].
D. Backdoor Attack
Backdoor attack implants backdoor into the ML model in
a way that the backdoored model learns both the attacker-
chosen sub-task and the (benign) main task [7], [8]. On the
one hand, the backdoored model behaves normally as its clean
counterpart model for inputs containing no trigger, so that it
is impossible to distinguish the backdoored model from the
clean model by solely checking the test accuracy with the
test samples. This is different from the above poisoning attack
that deteriorates the overall accuracy of the main task. On the
other hand, the backdoored model is misdirected to perform
the attacker’s sub-task once the secret trigger is presented in
the input, e.g., even regardless of the input’s original content.
III. BACKGROUND
We categorize the backdoor attack surface into six main
categorizations, as shown in Fig. 9. Each attack surface could
affect different stages of the ML pipeline. We then briefly de-
scribe each attack surface of backdoor attacks. We also provide
the background information about commonly recognized back-
door variants. We then provide some preliminaries, mainly
notations that are frequent used in following descriptions.
A. Attack Surface
1) Code Poisoning: It is common for ML practitioners
to employ deep learning frameworks, including Caffe [52],
TensorFlow [53], and Torch frameworks [54], to boost their
development. These frameworks are often built over third party
software packages that may not be trivial to audit or test.
Therefore, a public deep learning framework could result in
vulnerabilities for the ML models built upon it. This even-
tually leads the attacker to potentially launch various attacks
ranging from denial-of-service attacks that crash or hang a
deep learning application to control-flow hijacking attacks
that either compromise the system compromise or evades
recognition [55]. The backdoor attack is specifically shown
to be practical by poisoning the code [56]. This attack surface
has the weakest attack assumption as it has no observation or
access to any training data or model architecture, but it would
potentially affect the largest number of victims.
2) Outsourcing: One main attack surface is that the user
outsources the model training to the third party due to the lack
of ML skills or/and computational resources. In this context,
the user defines the model architecture, provides training data,
and outsources training to Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) service. The malicious MLaaS provider controls the
training phase and backdoors the ML model during the training
process. In this context, the flexibility of performing strong
backdoor attacks is maximized.
3) Pretrained: The third attack surface is introduced when
a pretrained model or ‘teacher’ model is reused. On the one
hand, the attacker can release and advertise a backdoored
feature extractor in the image classification to the public,
e.g., a model zoo used by victims to be reused for transfer
learning [9], [57]. In natural language processing, the word
embedding can act as a feature extractor that may have
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Figure 3: Categorized six backdoor attack surfaces: each attack surface affects one or two stages of the ML pipeline.
also been maliciously manipulated [58]. Transfer learning is
common to train a ‘student’ model with limited data. This is
usually the case when data acquisition and labels entail high
cost and expertise [47]. On the other hand, the attacker can
first download a popular pretrained benign teacher model from
the public domain and manipulates the original model, which
is retraining it with additional data crafted by the attacker
(even no need to access the original training data), and thus
backdooring the model. Then the attacker redistributes the
backdoored model to the model market [59], [60].
4) Data Collection: The data collection is usually error-
prone and susceptible to untrusted sources [44]. So that if a
user collected training data from multiple sources, then poi-
soning attacks could be a realistic concern. For example, there
are public dataset relies on volunteers’ contribution [61], [62]
or/and crawling data from public Internet e.g., ImageNet [63].
The OpenAI trains GPT-2 model on all webpages where at
least 3 users of the social media site Reddit had interacted with
the link [64]. To be precise, some data may have been poi-
soned. When those poisoned data are used for training a model,
even following a benign training process, the model can still
be infected. Specifically, clean-label poisoning attacks [65],
[66], as well as image-scaling poisoning attacks [67], [68], lie
under such attack surface.
5) Collaborative Learning: The fourth scenario is under
the collaborative learning represented by distributed learning
techniques, e.g., federated learning and split learning [11],
[69]. For example, Google trains word prediction models from
data localized on user phones [70]. Collaborative learning or
distributed learning is designed to protect privacy leakage on
the data owned by clients or participants. During the learning
phase, the server has no access to the training data of the
participants. This makes collaborative learning is vulnerable
to various attack [71], including backdoor attack. Since the
jointly learned model can be easily backdoored even when
a very small number of participants are compromised or
controlled by an attacker. Both local data poisoning [72] and
model poisoning [11], [73], [74] can be carried out by the
attacker to implant backdoor into the joint model. We consider
the data encryption under this backdoor attack surface such as
CryptoNet [75], SecureML [76] and CryptoNN [77], which
trains the model over encrypted data in order to protect data
privacy. This is, in particular, the case when the data are
contributed from different clients because now it is impossible
to check whether the data has been poisoned for the sake of
inserting backdoor or not.
6) Post-deployment: Such a backdoor attack can occur after
the ML model has been deployed, particularly during the
inference phase [78], [79]. Generally, the model parameter (in
particular weight) is tampered [80] by fault attacks [78], [81],
[82] through side-channels such as laser, voltage and row-
hammer. Here is one typical attack scenario, the ML parameter
loaded in the cache of the cloud server can be changed by
performing row-hammer side-channel attacks remotely by an
attacker who shares the same server but without privilege
access capability. We note that such an attack cannot be
mitigated through offline inspection.
B. Backdoor Variants
1) Class-specific and Class-agnostic: A backdoor attack is
usually targeted because one input is misclassified as the class
chosen by an attacker. Backdoor attacks can be categorized
into class-agnostic (when the trigger effect is independent of
the source classes) and class-specific attacks (when the trigger
effect is dependent on the source classes). As for the former,
a backdoored model can misclassify input from any class
stamped with the trigger into the targeted class. That is, the
trigger’s presence dominantly determines the attack. As for the
6latter, a backdoored model can misclassify input from specific
classes stamped with the trigger into the targeted class. That is,
the trigger’s presence along with the specific class determines
the attack.
Though we do specifically consider class-specific attacks in
this review, we note that most backdoor attacks and counter-
measure are class-agnostic attacks. Therefore, below we list a
number of representative backdoor variants of class-agnostic
attacks [83], [84].
2) Multiple Triggers to Same Label: (V1) In this case, the
presence of any trigger among multiple triggers can hijack the
backdoored model to the same targeted label.
3) Multiple Triggers to Multiple Labels: (V2) In this case,
the backdoored model can be hijacked with multiple triggers;
however, each trigger targets a different label.
4) Trigger Size, Shape and Position : (V3) All these trigger
settings can be arbitrary to the attacker. For the audio and text
domains, the shape of the trigger might not be applicable.
5) Trigger Transparency : (V4) In the vision domain, this
occurs when the trigger is blended with the input image. This
can also refer to the invisibility of the trigger. In the audio
domain, this is related to the trigger amplitude of the audio.
In text, this means that the semantic is remained.
It is noted that most backdoor works have taken V3 and
V4 into consideration. Relatively few studies consider other
variants.
C. Backdoor Preliminary
We can formally define the backdoor attack as follows.
Given a benign input xi, on the one hand, the prediction
za = FΘbd(xi) of the backdoored model has a very high
probability of being the same as the ground-truth label zi—
zi is argmaxi∈[1,M ] yi. In this context, the backdoored model
FΘbd has equal behavior of the clean model FΘcl . Herein,
y ∈ Rm is a probability distribution over the M classes.
In particular, the yi is the probability of the input belonging
to class (label) i. On the other hand, given a trigger input
xai = xi + ∆ with the ∆ being the attacker’s trigger stamped
on a clean input xi, the predicted label will always be the class
za set by the attacker, even regardless of what the specific
input xi is. In other words, as long as the trigger xa is
present, the backdoored model will classify the input to what
the attacker targets. However, for clean inputs, the backdoored
model behaves as a benign model , that is without (perceivable)
performance deterioration. Please be noted that most backdoor
attacks and countermeasures focus on input-agnostic trigger or
class-agnostic trigger. But some of them do study the class-
specific trigger—class-agnostic and class-specific trigger are
detailed in subsection III-B.
The success of backdoor attack can be generally evaluated
by clean data accuracy (CDA) and attack success rate (ASR),
which can be defined as below [47]:
Definition 1. Clean Data Accuracy (CDA): The CDA is the
proportion of clean test samples containing no trigger that are
correctly predicted to their ground-truth classes.
Definition 2. Attack Success Rate (ASR): The ASR is the
proportion of clean test samples with stamped triggers that
are predicted to the attacker targeted classes.
For successful backdoored model FΘbd , the CDA should
be similar to the clean model FΘcl , while the ASR is high—
backdoored models can achieve an ASR that is close to 100%
usually under outsource attributing to the full control over
the training process and data.
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d )
Figure 4: Different means of constructing triggers. (a) An
image blended with the Hello Kitty trigger [8]. (b) Dis-
tributed/spread trigger [48], [49]. (c) Accessory (eye-glass) as
trigger [39]. (d) Facial characteristic as trigger: left with arched
eyebrows; right with narrowed eyes [40].
To ease the readability, we generally provide some terms
used frequently in this review.
1) The user is exchangeably with defender, as in most
cases, the defender is the end-user of the DNN model.
The attacker is the one who wants to backdoor the
model using any means.
2) The clean input refers to the input that is free of a trig-
ger; it could be the original training sample, validation
sample, or test sample. We may alternatively use clean
sample, clean instance and benign input for easing the
description when necessary.
3) The trigger input is the input contains the attacker
chosen trigger in order to fire the backdoor. We may
alternatively use trigger sample, trigger instance, and
poisoned input for easing the description when neces-
sary.
4) The target class or target label refers to the attacker
targeted class/label given the trigger input.
5) The source class or source label refers to the class/label
within which the attacker chose an input to stamp with
the trigger.
6) The latent representation or latent feature, informally,
refers to an (often lower-dimensional) representation of
high-dimensional data, in particular, the input. Latent
representation is the feature from internal layers within
deep neural network in following descriptions, unless
otherwise states. As will be witnessed later, number of
countermeasures exploit latent representation to detect
backdoor behavior.
7) Digital Attack: Adversarial perturbations are stamped
on the digital inputs (e.g., through the modification on
the pixels in the digital images).
8) Physical Attack: Adversarial perturbations are physical
objects in the physical world where the attacker has no
control over the digital input. For example, a physical
glass can be a backdoor trigger that will be captured by
7the face recognition system. The captured digital image
is out of the reach of the attacker.
Notably, physical attacks should be robust against analog-to-
digital conversions such as light brightness, noise, angle, and
distance variations for capturing images. While digital attacks
can use imperceptible perturbations, the physical attack can be
readily achieved through backdoor attack [39], [40], [50] using
perceptible but inconspicuous triggers such as accessories [39]
or even facial expressions [40], see some trigger examples
in Fig. 4. Noting that most ML models, e.g., autonomous
driving systems, are deployed in an autonomous means, even
the perceptible perturbation could be suspicious to humans; the
defender could be unaware of it unless the system can throw an
alert. The physical attack is more realistic and dangerous [48],
[51].
IV. BACKDOOR ATTACKS
We organize the below review mainly according to attack
surface identified in the aforementioned section. We follow the
same order except a defer of code poisoning to be last
for easing description. For reviewed attacks under each attack
surface, a highlight is presented. At the end of this section, a
comparison and summary is provided for convenience.
A. Outsourcing Attack
Though earlier neural network backdoor can be dated back
to 2013 [85], the proliferation of backdoor attacks started in
2017 following works from Gu et al. [7], Chen et al. [8] and
Liu et al. [59]. Gu et al. [7] and Chen et al. [8] concurrently
demonstrate the backdoor attack where the attacker as a third
party has access to the training data and the model. Thus, the
attacker can manipulate the data or/and the model parameters
according their willing to insert backdoor. It is worth to
mention there are other studies during this early period [6],
[86] with a similar outsource threat model. One common
strategy is to stamp the attacker-chosen trigger with (randomly
picked) clean samples to form trigger samples, and meanwhile
change the labels of these trigger samples to the targeted
class. The trained model over normal samples and trigger
samples learns to associate the trigger to the target class while
maintaining the CDA of clean samples to be similar to a clean
model. In other words, the model can efficiently learn the
attacker-chosen backdoor sub-task and its main task at the
same. Gu et al. [7] use a square-like fixed trigger located
in the right corner of the digit image of the MNIST data
to demonstrate the backdoor attack, with a attack success
rate of over 99% without impacting model performance on
benign inputs. In addition, triggers to misdirect traffic sign
classifications is studied in [7].
Invisible Trigger. There are works [87], [88] to make the
trigger invisible by humans. Here, the trigger cannot be
arbitrary. For example, the trigger can be chosen as a constant
change of pixel intensity added to an input (ie. additive
attack) [87]. However, it may not be attractive for performing
such invisible trigger attack if the trigger input’s label still
needs to be changed—the input content and corresponding
label are still inconsistent. In this context, the data poisoning
methods under data collection, see Section IV-C such
as clean-label poison tends to be more practical and stealthy,
which can easily fool human inspection as well—the input
context and label are now consistent. In addition, we regard
one strength of the backdoor attack is the arbitrary chosen of
trigger to facilitate the attack phase, especially under the phys-
ical world. Invisible trigger is hard to survive under e.g., angle,
distance, light variations in the physical world. It appears that
such invisible trigger is unfeasible for some attack scenarios,
for example, physical accessory such as a glass, earring or
necklace to bypass the face recognition system. It should be
noted that the invisibility leads the trigger to be more like
added noise. To a large extent, the defense against adversary
examples can be applied to defense such invisible backdoor
attack. There are a number of effective countermeasures, e.g.,
feature squeezing [89], input transformation [90], [91], noise
reduction [92] that may be applicable to defeat such invisible
trigger attacks.
Dynamic Trigger. Backdoor attacks usually utilize a static
trigger, that is a fixed pattern placed in a fixed location. The
static trigger is trivial to craft for digital attack but tends to be
difficult for physical attack, e.g., the location and angle is hard
to be controlled to be consistent when the image is taken by
the surveillance camera. Salem et al. [93] explicitly and sys-
tematically study the practicality of dynamic trigger which can
hijack the same label with different trigger patterns that shall
share similar latent representation, and locations by exploiting
the generative adversarial model to algorithmically generate
triggers to facilitate the backdooring. A simpler investigation
of dynamic trigger is also performed by et al. [94]. Dynamic
trigger could facility flexibly crafting during physical attack
phase attributing to its constant efficacy under substantial
variations. It is shown that dynamic triggers backdoor attack is
more powerful, which requires new techniques to defeat since
it breaks the static trigger assumption on which most current
defenses build [93].
Most backdoor attacks are focusing on classification tasks—
mainly vision domain. There are studies beyond (image)
classification.
Backdoor Reinforcement Learning. There are examinations
on backdoor threats to sequential models [95], [96], in par-
ticular, reinforcement learning that aims to solve sequential
decision problems where an environment provides feedback
in the form of a reward to a state. More efforts/considerations
needed to backdoor this sequential model in comparison with
trivially backdooring classification models via training data
manipulation. Because a successful attack needs to disrupt
the sequential decisions made by a reinforcement learning
policy and not just one isolated decision, while maintain-
ing the backdoored model good performance in absence of
trigger [96]. This enforces the attacker to carefully decide at
which timesteps the state is poisoned and the corresponding
action and reward are manipulated. Through LSTM based
reinforcement learning under outsourcing, Yang et al. [95]
has backdoored it to successfully learn an adversarial policy—
the backdoor—to make attacker chosen sequential actions, be-
sides the normal policy to perform the benign model expected
actions. For backdoored sequential model, one distinction
8is the means of the trigger being presented and backdoor
behavior being activated. In previous backdoored classification
tasks, the adversarial behaviour is activated instantly when
the trigger is presented, and then disappears once the trigger
is absent. In contrast, Yang et al. [95] demonstrate that the
action can be unsynchronized with the presence of the trigger
in the backdoored sequential model—the adversarial action
can be several steps afterwards. In addition, the trigger is only
presented a short time of period—e.g., at a specific step, but
the backdoor behaviour will continue given the trigger being
disappeared. These two properties could make the trigger
detection more daunting as it becomes infeasible to link the
trigger with the adversarial actions even the adversarial action
is indeed noticed.
Wang et al. [21] examines the backdoor attack on reinforce-
ment learning based autonomous vehicles (AV) controllers
that are used to manage vehicle traffic. By setting the trigger
as a specific set of combination of positions and speeds of
vehicles that are collected by various sensors, the AV controller
could be maliciously activated to cause a physical crash or
congestion when the corresponding triggers appear acting as
instructions to accelerate and decelerate. Such backdoor attack
is validated using a general purpose traffic simulator [21].
Code Processing. Source code processing now also uses
neural network. Ramakrishnan [97] investigated backdoor
attacks against code summarization and classification. For
example, the learned model determines whether the source
code is safe or not. To preserve the functionality of the source
code, dead-code is employed as trigger. The authors noted
that though dead-code maybe eliminated by applying a dead-
code elimination compiler, it is easy to construct dead-code to
bypass it. Under the same research line, Schuster et al. [98]
investigate backdoor attack on neural network based code
autocompleters, where code autocompletion is nowadays a
key feature of modern code editor and integrated development
environment (IDE) providing the programmer with a short list
of likely completions built upon the code typed so far. The
backdoored autocompleter is misdirected to make suggestions
for attacker-chosen contexts without significantly changing
its suggestions in all other contexts and, therefore, without
affecting the overall accuracy. For example, the backdoored
autocompleter confidently suggests the electronic codebook
(ECB) mode—an old and insecure mode—for encryption an
secure sockets layer (SSL) connection. Both backdoors [97],
[98] are mainly implemented from training data poisoning,
while fine-tuning an existing benign model is also exploited
by Schuster et al. [98]. For both attacks, the triggers are
carefully identified or selected in order to strengthen the attack
performance.
Backdoor Graph Neural Network. There are two concurrent
backdoor attacks on graph neural network (GNN) [22], [99],
while the work [99] focuses on the pretrained attack
surface—description is deferred in following Section IV-B.
Considering the discrete and unstructured graph character-
istics, the triggers herein are defined as specific subgraphs,
including both topological structures and descriptive (node and
edge) features, which entails a large trigger design spectrum
for the adversary [99]. The GNN can perform two basic graph
analytics: node classification that predicts a label for each node
in a graph; and graph classification predicts a label for the
entire graph. Zhang et al. [22] study the GNN’s vulnerable
to backdoor attack and focus on the graph classification task,
where a subgraph pattern is used as a trigger to replace a
subgraph within an input graph. The backdoored model is
trained through a combination of trigger graphs with manipu-
lated targeted label, and clean graphs. High ASR of such GNN
backdoor attack with a small impact on the CDA for clean
graphs are validated via three real-world datasets. A certified
defense, in particular, randomized subsampling based defense
is also evaluated, but it is not always effective. Thus, new
defenses are required against GNN based backdoor attacks.
Notes: Outsourcing backdoor attacks are easiest to
perform as the attacker i) has full access to training data and
model, and ii) controls the trigger selection and the training
process. Therefore, they can carry out data poisoning or/and
model poisoning to backdoor the returned model. Given con-
trol of training process, it is worth to mention that the attacker
can always take the evasion-of-the-defense objectives into the
loss function to adaptive bypass existing countermeasures [11],
[56], [79], [100].
B. Pretrained Attack
This attack is usually mounted via transfer learning scenario,
where the user is limited with rich data or/and computational
resources to train an accurate model. Therefore, the user
will use a public or third party pretrained model to extract
general features. As illustrated in Fig. 5, here the DNN, FΘ
can be generally treated as two components, feature extractor
fΘ and task-specific classification layers gΘ. The former is
usually performed by convolutional layers to encode domain
knowledge that is non-specific to tasks. The later is usually
performed by dense layers or fully connect layers. In transfer
learning, the users usually replace the dense layers gΘ but
completely retain or only fine-tune feature extractor fΘ. Thus,
backdoored feature extractor fΘbd entails inherent security
risk when it is reused to train a ML system through transfer
learning.
Trojan Attack. Liu et al. [59] backdoor the published model
and then redistribute it. Inserting backdoor in this way eschews
overheads of training the entire model from scratch. It does not
need to access original training data of the published model
because they first carry out reverse engineer to synthesize the
training data, In stead of arbitrarily set a trigger, they generate
a trigger to maximize the activation of chosen internal neurons
in the neural network. This builds a stronger connection
between triggers and internal neurons, thus requiring less
training samples to inject backdoors [60]. Once the trigger is
generated, they produce two types of inputs: i) the reverse
engineered input and ii) the reverse engineered input with
trigger, to retrain the model. To expedite retraining, only
the the neurons between the previous identified neuron and
output layers are tuned. In this way, the model retains CDA
while achieves a high ASR. Strictly, this attack does not
specifically target transfer learning on which the victim trains
the student model. In fact, it exploits the published model to
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Figure 5: Transfer learning. Generally, a model can be dis-
entangled to two components: feature extractor that has con-
volutional layers, and classifier that has fully connect layers
for vision task. Usually the pretrained teacher ML model, e.g.,
VGG [101], is trained over a large-scale dataset, Data 1 such as
ImageNet [63], that the user is unable to obtain or the training
computation is extensive. The user can use the feature extractor
of the pretrained ML model to extract general feature, which is
then able to gain an accurate student model given her specific
task usually over a small Data 2.
expedite the backdoor process and expects the victim to use
the redistributed backdoored model directly. Nonetheless, it is
shown if later victim indeed adopts this backdoored model for
transfer learning, the model accuracy on the trigger input will
be degraded to some extent—messing up its correct behaviour.
However, as the attacker does not know the output labels of
the new task, the trigger input is incapable of misdirecting the
new model to a target label.
Model Reuse Attack. Ji et al. [9] propose so-called model-
reuse attack to backdoor the pretrained model, more precisely,
the feature extractor. A surrogate classifier gΘ—could be a
simple fully connect layer along with a softmax layer—is
used to train a fΘbd from its counterpart fΘcl . Given the
attacker-chosen trigger input or more specifically the adver-
sarial input—noting here the trigger is a general term, the
entire input image is referred as trigger, the attacker selectively
changes a small fraction of the weights of fΘcl . The change
of selected weights maximizes the adversarial input to be
misclassified into the target class, while the change has least
degradation on legitimate inputs to be correctly classified. It
is shown that the ASR is high, e.g., 90-100% and the CDA is
imperceptibly influenced given the user deploys fΘbd to train
a ML system even with fine-tuning on the fΘbd .
Model reuse attack [9] assumes no knowledge of gΘ used by
the user. The fΘbd maybe partially or fully fine-tuned by the
user. However, the attacker does need to know the downstream
task and a small dataset used by the user. In contrast to
conventional backdoor attacks where any input stamped with
the trigger will be misclassified. It appears model-reuse attack
is only applicable to a limited adversarial inputs [9]. Noting
the term ‘trigger’ used in [9] has quite different meaning and
has no generalization. The ‘trigger’ to the backdoored fΘbd is
one or few attacker chosen specific image inputs—termed as
single trigger and multiple trigger attacks in [9]. Such effect
can be comparably achieved by adversarial example attacks
with a main difference that the attacker arbitrary control over
the adversarial example (so called trigger input(s) herein [9])
under model-reuse attack. In addition, as this attack needs to
limit the amplitude and number of internal model parameters
changed to not degrade the CDA, attack efficacy to DNN
model with relatively small number of parameters or/and
binary network work [102], e.g., those targeting lightweight
mobile devices, might be limited.
Programmable Backdoor. A later work [57] eschews the
assumption on the knowledge of specific task chosen by
the user, namely programmable backdoor. Herein, the feature
extractor fΘbd is trained along with a trigger generator.
The generator, eventually a separate neural network, consists
of an encoder and decoder. The encoder encodes a target
image into an intermediate feature or latent representation,
which is decoded by the decoder into a small trigger pattern.
During attack phase, this trigger pattern is stamped with a
source image—trigger pattern is much smaller than the source
image—to craft a trigger image. When this trigger image is
seen by the student model fine-tuned from fΘbd via transfer
learning, it will misclassify the trigger image into the target
class. The trigger pattern is eventually a smaller representation
of the target image chosen from the target class and can be
flexibly produced during attack phase, therefore, the backdoor
is flexibly programmable. In addition, the attacker can choose
target image from any class, such class is unnecessarily known
by the attacker when the backdoor is inserted. Therefore,
the number of target class infected is unlimited, which is
an advantage over the above model reuse attack [9]. Similar
to [9], its attack efficacy is dependent on the size of the fΘcl—
redundancy information. The CDA drop could be noticeable
and ASR is lower when the size of target model fΘcl is small,
e.g., MobileNet [103]. In addition, fine-tuning the entire fΘbd
rather than solely the fully connect layers gΘ can greatly
reduce the ASR, though the ASR cannot be fundamentally
eliminated.
Latent Backdoor. Yao et al. [60] propose the latent backdoor
attack to infect the pretrained teacher model. Generally, latent
backdoor is ‘incomplete’ backdoor injected into the teacher
model—the attacker target label za does not exist in the
teacher model yet. However, if any student models include
za, then transfer learning process automatically completes the
backdoor and makes it active. Recall that the attacker has
no control over the user transfer learning process. Then the
attacker can attack the student model with the trigger deter-
mined when backdooring the student model. To be precise,
this attack follows below steps. Firstly, the attacker chooses
a clean teacher model. He also determines the future target
class za that is not currently within the teacher task. But the
attacker does need to collect source sample of za, e.g., from
public. Here, we take an example, where VGG16 is as clean
teacher model, and Musk that is not a recognizable face of
VGG16 is as the future target label za. Secondly, the attacker
retrains teacher model to i) include za as a classification label,
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ii) injects latent backdoor related to za, then iii) replaces the
classification layer to remove output za, and iv) preferable
further fine-tunes on the last layer. In this way, the backdoored
model has same benign functionality with the clean model.
Thirdly, a victim downloads the backdoored teacher model,
applies transfer learning to customize the user’s downstream
task that includes za as one of the class, As a result, the latent
backdoor will be activated as a live backdoor in the student
model. For example, Tesla builds its own facial recognition
task building upon the infected VGG16 and adds Musk as
one class. During attack, any image with the trigger will be
misclassified to Musk by the backdoor propagated student
model. The key in this latent backdoor attack is to associate
trigger to intermediate representation within internal layer,
e.g., 14th layer out of total 16 layers in the teacher model,
instead of the final output label that adopted by conventional
attacks. To amplify the ASR, the trigger is not randomly
chosen but optimized through an algorithm. Latent backdoor
has advantage of stealthiness. However, it only works when
the downstream task contains the attacker speculated label za.
It easily bypasses NeuralCleanse [83] defense that iteratively
goes through all output labels to discover triggers. Because
the teacher model does not have the infected label za yet.
However, the ASR drops to almost zero if the user fine-tunes
earlier e.g., 12th layer before the layer that associates the
intermediate trigger representation, e.g., 14th. In fact, the latter
fine-tune strategy is not uncommonly used in practice.
Appending Backdoor. Tang et. al propose a different model-
agnostic backdoor attack without access to neither training
data nor training the targeted model [104]. It is also with an ad-
vantage of unlimited number of target classes as programmable
backdoor [57]. Overall, it achieves so by appending or merging
another separate backdoored (small) neural network with the
target model. Therefore, it does not tamper parameters of the
target model. As a trade-off, this work has to change the model
architecture. In practice, architecture change is not stealthy,
thus it is easily detectable by checking the model architecture
specifications.
GNN Backdoor. Concurrent to this work [22] that evaluates
the graph neural network (GNN) vulnerability to backdoor
under outsource, Xi et al. [99] investigate the GNN
vulnerability to backdoor under pretrained. Here, it is
assumed [99] the attacker has access to the downstream task
and a set of data samples. But, similar to [57], [60], it does
not need knowledge of downstream classifier gΘ and fine-
tuning strategies applied by the user. The pretrained GNN
model fΘbd can be trained by the attacker from scratch or
from a published model. Here, the graph trigger is interactively
optimized along with the training of fΘbd to increase the ASR
and stealthiness. The later is achieved by adaptively tailoring
graph trigger dependent on the given graph and mix it within
the graph in a way of replacing a subgraph. The subgraph
within the given graph that is found by a mixing function is
most similar to the graph trigger. Based on five public dataset
validations, it is shown the ASR could be up to 100% and with
comparable CDA to clean graph model. It is also shown that
current Neural Cleanse [83] fails to defeat the GNN backdoor.
Notes: Pretrained backdoor attacks has wide victim
impacts as employing pretrained teacher model to customize
the user’s downstream task is now a good practice to expe-
dite the DNN model training with high accuracy even with
limited training data or/and computational resources. Besides
vision tasks, such attacks have been also applied to natural
language processing [58], [105]. However, as the attacker has
no control of the downstream tasks and the transfer learning
strategy adopted by the user. The ASR is usually not high
as outsourcing backdoor attacks. As for the the latent
backdoor [60], the ASR can be easily disrupted. It is worth
to mention that the pretrained backdoor attack, more or
less, assumes certain knowledge of the downstream tasks—
may be speculated—and a small set of data for the downstream
tasks—may be collected from public.
C. Data Collection Attack
Data collection attack succeeds to poison data, and con-
sequently backdoor the model without inside access. This
needs the poisoned data to be stealthier, in particular, to fool
human inspection. However, the attacker cannot control and
manipulate the training process or final model.
Figure 6: Clean-label attack [65].
Clean-Label Attack. Clean-label attack preserves the label
of poisoned data, and the tampered image still looks like
begin sample [65], [66]. Take Fig 6 as an example, the fish
image has been poisoned, where its latent feature, however,
represents dog. Here, the fish is the source instance and dog
is the target instance. Such poisoned sample will be labeled
by domain experts as fish, thus, attacker needs no control of
the labeling process. After the model is trained over poisoned
(e.g., fish samples) and clean samples. such backdoored model
will misclassify targeted instance e.g., dog into the source
instance e.g., fish. Notably, the targeted instance does not
require perturbation during inference—no trigger is used.
Clean-label attack exploits feature collision. To be precise, the
crafted poison fish still appears like source fish instance in the
input space or pixel level (e.g., the visual appearance), but it
is close to the targeted dog instance dog in latent feature space
when features is more abstract such as in the penultimate layer.
Clean-label attack demonstrated in [65] is class-specific and
targeted success rate is low, e.g., 60%, in end-to-end attack (the
victim model is trained from scratch rather from pretrained
model) for a 10-class classification setting. Clean-label attack
in [65] is performed under white-box setting, where the
attacker has complete knowledge of the victim model. Such
constraint is eschewed in later improvements that not only
work under black-box setting but also greatly increases attack
success rate [66], [106]. Instead of feature collision attack,
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efficacy of later works are realized via exploiting convex
polytope attack [66] and bi-level optimization problem [106],
respectively, to poison clean-label samples. In addition to
image classification, clean-label attacks has been applied to
backdoor video recognition models [107]. Noting for these
clean-label attack, the triggers are a particular set of (testing)
image samples—not universal specific pattern. In other words,
the backdoor attack is only possible for one or a small set
of inputs—note model-reuse attack [9] under pretrained
achieves a similar backdoor effect.
Interestingly, Saha et al. [108] exploits the clean-label attack
in a robust manner. Here, the trigger used in poisoning phase or
the poisoning trigger is invisible to evade human inspections.
However, the trigger used in inference is visible to increase
the attack robustness, importantly, for physical attack. The
key is that the trigger used in poison phase shares same
latent representation with the trigger used in inference phase.
Therefore, even the inference trigger is not explicitly seen
during training phase, it can still activate the backdoor. Such
hidden backdoor attack appears to be more practical and
robust as visible inference trigger is only revealed when attack
is presented but hidden during data poisoning via invisible
poisoning trigger. These clean-label attacks assume knowledge
of the model to be used by the victim, e.g., to perform transfer
learning [108]. The reason is that the attacker needs to have
knowledge of the latent representation.
Severi et al. [109] note the fact that training pipeline of
many security vendors naturally enables backdoor injection
for security related classifiers, e.g., malware classifier. Because
these vendors or companies heavily rely on crowd-sourced
threat feeds (records) to create a large, diverse stream of data to
train the classifier due to the difficulty of exclusively creating
in-house data sources. The issue of labeling malware into
families, or determining if an unknown binary is or is not
malware, is labor intensive and requires significant domain
knowledge and training [110]. For example, an expert analyst
can often take around 10 hours to characterize a malicious
binary. This is in contrast to many current machine learning
domains, like image classification, where labeling can often
be done by individuals with no special expertise and with
acceptable time. In other words, these threat feeds or data
sources are built upon user-submitted binaries, which can
be readily abused by attackers for backdoor attacks [109].
Severi et al. develop a clean-label attack to backdoor malware
classifiers of both gradient boosting trees and a neural network
model, even when the attacker has black-box access to the user
deployed models by only poising a small fraction, e.g., 2%, of
malware. The poisoned goodware/malware is still recognized
as goodware/malware by anti-virus engine.
Targeted Class Data Poisoning. Barni et al. [111] recognize
that conventional backdoor introduced by data poisoning,
which randomly i) picks up training samples across different
source classes, ii) stamps triggers, and iii) modifies their labels
to the targeted class. Noting, in clean-label attack [65], [66],
[108], the label is not modified but the poisoned source images
could be from different classes. Therefore, Barni et al. [111]
slightly changes the way of picking up data for poisoning.
It is shown that it is feasible to only stamping triggers on
the data samples belonging to the targeted class—thus, label
is consistent with the content—to backdoor the model to
misclassify any input to the targeted label. This is because the
model is still able to learn the association between the trigger
and the targeted class. Together with invisible, or semantically
indistinguishable trigger to human, such poisoned data can
evade the inspection from humans. This data poisoning strat-
egy is used in [112] to implant backdoor with a delicate crafted
natural trigger, namely refection that is a natural common
phenomenon wherever there are glasses or smooth surfaces.
One trade-off of this targeted class data poisoning is the
fraction of poisoned data of the targeted class needs to be
high [113].
Turner et al [113] relaxes the above limitation. One obser-
vation is that poisoned inputs can be modified in a way to
make the model harder to classify to its ground-truth label.
Since these inputs will be harder to learn, the model will
be forced to learn an strong association between the trigger
to the label. In this way, the poison ratio will be reduced.
Two label-consistent data poisoning methods: GAN-based and
adversarial perturbations are proposed to inject backdoor. The
GAN method interpolates poisoned inputs towards a source
class in the latent space—similar to feature collision, while
the poisoned input visually consistent to the its label that is
indeed the target label. For the adversarial perturbations, it
exploits the method of crafting adversarial examples. Before
adding triggers to a input, perturbation is firstly made to this
input to make the model harder to learn it. Then the trigger
is added to the adversarial perturbed input to form a poisoned
input. To be effective for the ASR, the attacker needs to have
full knowledge of the model architecture and later training
procedure [113].
Image-Scaling Attack. Image-scaling attack or scaling-
camouflage attack [67] has no knowledge of training data,
model and parameters, which affects all applications that
utilize scaling algorithms for resizing input images. In terms of
deep learning, image-scaling attack abuses the scaling function
in the image preprocess pipeline that is popular in deep
learning framework such as Caffe, TensorFlow and PyTorch
to disguise content. It is common the input size to the model
is fixed, e.g., 224×224×3 with 224 is height and width, and
3 is colour channel. However, the original image is usually
much larger than this input size and has to be resized via
downsampling operation. One attack example is illustrated in
Fig. 7. The ‘wolf’ image is embedded/disguised delicately into
the ‘sheep’ image by the attacker by abusing the resize() func-
tion. When this attack ‘wolf’ image is resized by the down-
sampling filter, the ‘sheep’ pixels are discarded and ‘wolf’
image is presented. This abuses inconsistent understanding of
the same image between humans and machines. Therefore,
scaling camouflage can be effectively and stealthily exploited
to perform backdoor attacks under black-box setting, it does
not require to have control over the labeling process [68].
General speaking, the trigger can be disguised in the training
data by performing image-scaling attacks to backdoor the
trained model. In inference phase, the trigger will easily
activate the backdoored model but without using a scaling
attack now.
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Figure 7: Image-scaling attack [67]. Left (labeled) sheep is
what human sees, right wolf is the actual input fed into the
DNN model after scaling to a fixed size e.g., 224× 224× 3,
that is a common resize process in deep learning. Notably, the
perturbation could be more imperceptible, here the perceptible
perturbation is used for demonstration purpose.
Notes. We can observe that the data collection attack is
also with wide victim, since it is a common strategy to gain
training data from public. As a matter of fact, a trust data
source is hard to be ensured. For the poisoned data, it would
be hard to be distinguished when they undergo manual or
vision inspection since the content is always consistent with
the label. As a consequence, not only end-to-end trained model
but also transfer learning could be infected. Feature collision is
a common means of crafting label-consistent poisonous inputs
to inject backdoors. However, in most cases, some knowledge
of the infected model architecture is required to determine a
proper latent representation.
D. Collaborative Learning Attack
SERVER
CLIENT 1 CLIENT 2 CLIENT 3 CLIENT 4
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3
Figure 8: Federated learning illustrated with four clients.
Collaborative learning aims to learn a joint/global model
with distributed clients but does not access to data resided in
the participant side. Though collaborative learning can greatly
protect the privacy of sensitive data without seeing it, it is
generally vulnerable to poisoning attacks, without exception
for backdoor attack. Federated learning is the most popular
collaborative learning technique nowadays [114], [115]. Fed-
erated learning interacts with clients many rounds. As shown
in 8, in each round, 1© the server sends a joint model—
it is randomly initialized in the first round—to all clients,
each client trains this model over her local data for one or
more local epochs—now the updated model is termed as local
model. 2© Then the server collects local models from a fraction
of client—could be all clients—and 3© applies an aggregation
algorithm, e.g., average, to update the joint model. This
process continues till the model converges or reaches the
predefined criterion. In this way, the joint model is trained
while local data never leaves the client hand.
Bagdasaryan et al. [11] apply model replacement to implant
backdoor into the joint model. Malicious client, e.g., client
3, controlled by the attacker uploads modified local model,
e.g., in step 2© as shown in Fig. 8 that are manipulated via
optimization, to the server, so that the joint model will be
consequentially backdoored. This attack is also referred to as
model poisoning [11], [73], [74]. It is shown that the joint
model is with 100% ASR immediately after the backdoor
being inserted even if a single client is selected to contribute
the joint model update in only one round (single-shot attack).
The ASR does diminish as the joint model continues to learn.
By controlling no more than 1% clients, the joint model is with
on par accuracy with the clean model and now cannot prevent
the backdoor being unlearned afterwards [11]. The backdoor
attack on federated learning is extremely challenging to defeat
as the data access is not allowed in principle. Byzantine-
resilient aggregation strategies are ineffective against such
attack [73]. Even worse, when secure aggregation is adopted
in order to further enhance privacy, the defense would become
more difficult [11], [74]. When the defense requires no training
data, e.g., DeepInspect [116], it however inverts the model to
extract the training data, which unfortunately violates the data
privacy preservation purpose of adopting federated learning.
Though Sun et al. [74] demonstrate norm clipping and weak
differential privacy may limit the attack to some extent, they
tend to be easily evaded with slight increased attention and
efforts by the attacker, especially when the adaptive attack is
considered [11], [73].
Xie et al. [117] investigate distributed backdoor attack
(DBA) on federated learning by fully taking advantage of
the the federated learning distribute characteristic. Instead of
assigning all controlled clients with the same global trigger
to poison their local models, the DBA decomposes the global
trigger into different (non-overlap) local triggers. Each mali-
cious client poisons her local model her own local trigger. As
an example, the four stickers shown in Fig. 4 (b). The joint
model will not exhibit backdoor effect if only one local trigger
presents, but will show the backdoor effect for the combined
local triggers—the global trigger during attack phase. It is
shown that the DBA is with better ASR and more robust
against robust federated learning aggregation methods than
previous backdoor attacks on federated learning [117]. It is
worth to mention that both DBA and global trigger attacks
achieve the same attack purpose—using the global trigger to
misdirect the backdoored joint model.
Chen et al. [25] study backdoor attack on the federated
meta-learning. Meta-learning, also known as “learning to
learn”, aims to train a model that can learn new skills or adapt
to new environments rapidly with a few training examples.
Therefore, federated meta-learning allows clients to have a
joint model to be adopted to their specific tasks even the
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data distribution among clients vary greatly. This means the
final model is build upon the joint model with further updates
with his specific local data, e.g., through fine-tuning. As one
prerequisite, the attacker needs to have knowledge of the target
class of the victim. In fact, the attack surface of federated
meta-learning is alike pre-trained but with a weaker
control on the joint model indirectly—attacker has full control
over the pre-trained model under pre-trained. As a result,
it is shown that properly adopt the (backdoored) joint model
to client specific task can reduce the backdoor effect to a large
extension [25]. Specifically, the authors propose a sanitizing
fine-tuning process building upon matching networks [118],
where the class of an input is predicted from the cosine
similarity of its weighted features with a support set of
examples for each class. It is shown the ASR, in this regard,
is reduced to only 20% validated through Omniglot and mini-
ImageNet datasets.
Notes. On one hand, collaborative learning becomes in-
creasing deployed. On the other hand, it is inherently vul-
nerable to backdoor attacks because it is hard to control the
data and the local model submitted by malicious participants.
Due to the privacy protection, the training data is not allowed
to be accessed by the defender, in particular, the server or
the model aggregator—this also applies to train a model over
encrypted data such as CryptoNet [75], SecureML [76] and
CryptoNN [77]. This makes the defense to be extremely chal-
lenge. Because most defense indeed need a (small) set of hold-
out validation samples to assist the backdoor detection. It is
noticed that DeepInspect [116] does not need to access training
data. Unfortunately, it however inverts the model to reverse
engineer the training data, which violates the data privacy
preservation purpose of adopting collaborative learning.
E. Post-Deployment Attack
This attack tampers the model during the post deployment
phase, thus does not rely on data poisoning to insert backdoors.
But it inevitably needs model access, which can be realized
by firstly insert a malicious software program. More stealthier,
it is feasible considering the rising of side-channel attacks,
more specifically, utilizing the row-hammer attack [123]. The
row-hammer attack allows an attacker to tamper the memory
content if the victim (CNN model) is co-located at the same
physical machine, which is common in today’s cloud service.
For example, a number of tenants are sharing the same
physical machine with separation from virtual machine [124].
Weight Tamper. As an early work, Dumford et al. [80]
examine the feasibility of backdooring a face recognition
system through solely perturbing weights that are resided in
specific layers—a similar study is demonstrated in [79]. Both
work [79], [80] intuitively assume that the attacker somehow
can access the model resided in the host file storage system
or memory e.g., through a toolkit, and tamper the weight
after model deployment. It demonstrates the possibility of
backdooring a model through perturbing the weights, though
it is extremely computationally hungry to achieve a good
attack successful rate, e.g., merely up to 50% [80]. The
main reason is extensive iterative search over the weights for
optimization [80]. Costales et al. [79] takes the evasion defense
as an objective when searching parameters to be modified to
bypass existing online inspection defense, specifically, evading
the STRIP [84].
Bit Flip. Rakin et al. [78] recognize the advantage of flip-
ping vulnerable bits of DNN weights. To determine which bits
need to be flipped, the last-layer neurons with the most impact
on the output for the targeted class are found using a gradient
ranking approach. This eventually requires knowledge of both
model architecture and parameters, which could be empowered
by model extraction attack [125]. In this context, it is worth
to mention that recent microarchitectural side-channel attacks
shows the feasibility of gaining such information including
revealing architecture [126] and stealing parameters [127] in
the cloud with the existing shared covert-channel. The trigger
is then generated using a minimization optimization technique.
Then, the original weight matrix and the final optimized
malicious weight matrix are compared—the weight here is
quantified to 8-bit, providing the information on which bits
need to be flipped. A small set of test samples is required
to determine the malicious weight matrix. The backdoor is
inserted through a row-hammer attack to flip the identified
bits in main memory—but this step is not really implemented
in [78]. In one experiment, the authors [78] are able to achieve
misclassification with a small number of bit flips, e.g., 84 out
of 88 million weight bits on ResNet18 [128] on CIFAR10.
It is acknowledged that backdoor a model trained over the
large-scale ImageNet is harder as both CDA and ASR drops
relatively noticeable. On the other hand, such post-deployment
attack via bit flipping—a kind of fault injection attack—is not
restricted to backdoor attack, which can be used to degrade
the model overall performance greatly [82], [129], [130], e.g.,
making all inputs accuracy to be low to random guess.
TrojanNet. Guo et al. [122] propose TrojanNet that even-
tually switches the backdoored model from its public appli-
cation task, e,g., traffic sign recognition, to a different secret
application task, e.g., face recognition given the presence of
the trigger. This is a different backdoor strategy, since the
public task and secret task are for totally differing applications.
For all other backdoor attacks, the attacker’s task and the
default benign task are within the same application. The
public task and secret task of TrojanNet share no common
features and the secret task remains undetectable without the
presence of a hidden trigger—here is a key [122]. Generally
speaking, the secret task and public task share the same model
parameter. Switching from public task to secret task is realized
by parameter permutation, which is determined by a key or
trigger. As stated by the authors, parameter permutation can be
done at loading time or at run-time in memory when a trigger
is activated. Such trigger can be embedded into a malicious
software. Training the public task and secret together is still
akin to multi-task learning, though they do not share any
feature. It is shown that multiple secret tasks can be co-exist
with the public task, while the utility of all secret task and the
public task can retain. Such a backdoor attack is extremely
hard to detect.
Notes. Post-deployment backdoor attack tends to be
non-trivial to perform by the attacker, because it requires first
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Table I: Backdoor attack summary under categorized attack surfaces. The 3rd to 7th columns qualitatively compare the attacker’s
capabilities under the corresponding attack surface.
Attack
Surface Backdoor Attacks
Access Model
Architecture
Access Model
Parameters
Access
Training Data
Trigger
controllability ASR
Potential
Countermeasure 1
Code
Poisoning
[55] [56] Black-Box # # G# High Offline Model InspectionOnline Model Inspection
Online Data Inspection
Outsourcing
Image [6], [7], [12], [86], [119] [8];
Text [13] [14]–[16];
Audio [16], [17];
Video [50];
Reinforcement Learning [21], [95] [96];
Code processing [97], [98];
Dynamic trigger [93]
Adaptive Attack [100];
Deep Generative Model [20];
Graph Model [22]
White-Box    Very High
Blind Model Removal
Offline Model Inspection
Online Model Inspection
Online Data Inspection
Pretrained
[7], [59]
Word Embedding [58];
NLP tasks [105];
Model-reuse [9];
Programmable backdoor [57];
Latent Backdoor [60];
Model-agnostic via appending [104];
Graph Model [99]
Grey-Box G# G# G# Medium
Blind Model Removal
Offline Model Inspection
Online Model Inspection
Online Data Inspection
Data
Collection
Clean-Label Attack [65], [66], [108] [112],
(video [50], [107]),
(malware classification [109]);
Targeted Class Data Poisoning [111], [113];
Image-Scaling Attack [67], [68];
Biometric Template Update [120];
Wireless Signal Classification [19]
Grey-Box # G# G# Medium Offline Data InspectionOnline Model Inspection
Online Data Inspection
Collaborative
Learning
Federated learning [11], [73], [74],
(IoT application [72]);
Federated learning with
distributed backdoor [117];
Federated meta-learning [25];
feature-partitioned
collaborative learning [121]
White-Box    High Offline Model Inspection 2
Post-deployment
[80] [78], [79]
Application Switch [122] White-Box   G# Medium Online Model InspectionOnline Data Inspection
 : Applicable or Necessary;  : Inapplicable or Unnecessary; G#: Partially Applicable or Necessary.
1 The detailed countermeasure methods are specified in section V. We consider they are potential, because it is recognized that there is
no single one-to-all countermeasure and they could be bypassed, especially for adaptive attackers.
2 This kind of backdoor attack is very challenge to defeat as the user, e.g., the model aggregator, may not even be able to access any
testing data. Rare defense requires no access to training data [116].
intrudes the system to implant a malicious program [80],
[122] or flips the vulnerable bits in memory during run-
time that needs professional expertise [78]. In addition,
Post-deployment backdoor attack usually requires white-
box access to the model. The advantage of this attack is that it
bypasses all offline inspections on the model or/and the data.
F. Code Poisoning Attack
Security risks of ML framework building upon public
repositories or libraries have been initially recognized in [55].
Regarding to backdoor attack, Bagdasaryan et al. [56] study
poisoning the code performing loss computation/function that
could be adopted by an attacker to insert backdoor into the
model, which is recognized as a new backdoor attack surface.
Backdoor insertion is viewed as an instance of multi-task
learning for conflicting objectives that are training the same
model for high accuracy on the main and attacker-chosen
backdoor task simultaneously. In this context, the attacker
can take the main task, backdoor task and even defense-
evasion objectives into a single loss function to train the model.
Bagdasaryan et al. [56] take advantage of a Multiple Gradient
Descent Algorithm with the Franke-Wolfe optimizer to con-
struct an optimal, self-balancing loss function that achieves
high accuracy on both the main and backdoor tasks. It is also
noticed that auditing4 and testing the loss-coumption code is
hard in practice [56]. This backdoor is therefore blind to the
attacker, termed as blind backdoor attack, since the attacker
has no access to his poisoned code during its execution, nor the
training data on which it operates, nor the resulting model, nor
any other output of the training process (e.g., model accuracy).
To be both data and model independent as neither is known in
advance, backdoor inputs are synthesized “on the fly” as well
as the corresponding backdoor loss. In this manner, backdoor
loss is always included in the loss function to optimize the
model for both the main and backdoor tasks.
It is demonstrated [56] that the backdoor task can be totally
different from the main task. For example, the main task of a
model is to count the number of faces in a photo, while the
backdoor task is covertly recognize specific individuals. Simi-
lar attacks have demonstrated in [59] under pretrained,
for example, the backdoor implanted into an age recogni-
tion model is still effective when the transfer learning task
building upon the pretrained age recognition model is for
gender recognition. In addition, multiple backdoor tasks can
be achieved using multiple synthesizers concurrently [56].
Moreover, evasion objective has been taken into the loss
4The codebase of loss computation code could contain dozens of thousands
of lines, which are hard to understand even by experts.
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function to show evasion of various countermeasures [56]—
this is an adaptive attack.
Notes. We regard code poisoning backdoor attack is
with the widest victims as it tampers the low-level ML code
repository. Such attack even requires no knowledge of the
model and no access to training data but achieves high ASR.
G. Discussion and Summary
Table I compares attacking capabilities and summarizes
works under each attack surface. Most of them attack
classification task, especially, image classification. We
can also observe that majority backdoor attacks are
resulted from outsourcing, pretrained, data
collection, collaborative learning attacking
surfaces. Backdoor attack studies from code poisoning
and post-deployment attack surfaces are relative less.
Generally, it is unsurprising that outsource has the
strongest control of the trigger setting and the highest ASR,
because the attacker has the maximum capability including
access to model, training data and the training process control.
In contrast, it is worth to note that the defender/user is with
the minimum capability when devising countermeasures under
such outsourcing attacks. Because the defender is usu-
ally limited with ML expertise and computational resources,
which are the reasons for outsourcing. In this context, the
countermeasures should properly take the defenders weakest
capability into consideration. This consideration should also be
always held when countering pretrained attacks, because
the user maybe usually lack of computational resource.
Though rare studies under code poisoning, it appears
that it has the widest attacking victims as it requires min-
imum attacking capability. The pretrained and data
collection attack also have wide attacking victims. Except
data collection, the attacker is very unlikely to expose
trigger inputs or poisoned data to defender until the trigger has
to be presented at attacking phase. This explains the offline
data inspection is inapplicable against attack surfaces except
data collection. It is very challenge for countering
collaborative learning attacks—model poisoning is
more effective in comparison with data poisoning, because
there is a trade-off between data privacy and security vul-
nerabilities. The defender, e.g., server, is even not allowed
to access any testing/training data to assist the defense. In
this case, only countermeasure [116] requiring no testing data
can be potentially considered. But this countermeasure [116]
first reverse engineers training data, partially violating the
purpose of adopting collaborative learning that is to protect
data privacy. In addition. it is impossible to guarantee that
none of heterogeneous resided clients of the collaborative
learning is malicious as the number of clients could be
high, e.g., hundreds of thousands. For the pretrained
attack, it is worth to mention that some knowledge of the
downstream student model tasks or/and training data is usually
necessary to perform attack. For both pretrained and
post-deployment attacks, the trigger is usually delicately
generated through some optimization algorithm, e.g., gradient-
based approach, rather than arbitrarily chosen in order to
achieve high ASR. Therefore, the flexibility of crafting ar-
bitrary trigger is, more or less, deteriorated.
Moreover, we recommend that attack studies always explic-
itly identify their threat models to clarify attacker’s capabili-
ties.
V. BACKDOOR COUNTERMEASURES
We firstly categorize countermeasures into four classes:
blind backdoor removal; offline inspection, online inspection,
and post backdoor removal. In fact, this four classes are,
somehow, align with possible sequential defense steps that
could be considered. We then systematically analysis each
countermeasure under these four classes. At the end of this
section, we provide comparisons, summaries and discussions.
A. Blind Backdoor Removal
The main feature of this defense categorization is that it
does not differentiate the backdoored model from clean model,
or trigger input from clean input. The main purpose is to
removal or suppress the backdoor effect while maintaining the
CDA of clean inputs, especially considering that the model is
eventually clean model.
Fine-Pruning. As an earlier defense, Liu et al. propose
to remove potential backdoor by firstly pruning carefully
chosen neurons of the DNN model that contribute least to the
classification task [131]. More precisely, neurons are sorted by
their activation on clean inputs, e.g., the hold-out validation
sample, and pruned in the order of least-activated. One general
assumption is that the neurons activated by clean and trigger
inputs are different, which is not usually the case. After
pruning, fine-tuning is used to restore model performance.
Nonetheless, this method substantially degrades the model
accuracy [83]. It is also cumbersome to perform fine-pruning
operations to any DNN model as most of them are more likely
to be benign. Similar approach presented in [6] incur high
complexity and computation costs.
Februus. Doan et al. propose Februus [132] to eliminate
the backdoor effect by online detecting and sanitizing the
trigger input at run-time. It can serve as a filter deployed in
front of any neural networks to cleanse the (trigger) inputs.
The idea is to utilize a Visual Explanation tool to recognize
the trigger region. Once the region is identified, Februus
will surgically remove the malicious area and replace by a
neutrally gray color. This surgically removing step has already
eliminated the trigger effect, however potentially degrade the
classification of the deep neural networks. One additional
step, image restoration, was proposed using a GAN-based
image inpainting method to restore the damaged areas to its
original likeliness before being contaminated. This method has
been shown to be robust against multiple backdoor variants,
especially the class-specific backdoor variant. However, as the
method involves with removing and restoring on the images,
it is sensitive to large-size trigger that covers a huge portion
of the images.
Suppression. Sarkar et al. [133] propose a backdoor sup-
pression via fuzzing that entails building a wrapper around
the trained model to neutralize the trigger effect. Given
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Figure 9: Categories of backdoor countermeasures: blind backdoor removal without first check whether the model is backdoored
or not; offline inspection on the data or model; online inspection on the (upcoming) data or model; post backdoor removal or
restoration after backdoor trigger is identified.
each input, a number of replicas are made: each replica is
perturbed by adding some noise—noise level is empirically
determined [133]. All perturbed replicas are fed into the DNN
model, regardless backdoored or clean, to collect predictions.
It is worth to mention such strategy is previously exploited
by [84]. The final prediction of the input is based on majority
voting of predictions of its perturbed replicas. A conceptually
similar work, namely certification, is devised by wang et
al. [134]. The evaluations on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset
demonstrate [133] that around 90% and 50% of trigger images
are reverted to their true predictions, respectively, which are
less effective than other run-time inspection methods. On the
other hand, it is acknowledged that this method compromises
the CDAs for clean inputs relatively unacceptable [40], thus,
it is unsuitable as a wrapper around the trained model. In
addition, the parameters such as the level of noise and the
number of replicas that define this wrapper, however, are
empirically searched and determined, which are not generic.
Moreover, this method appears to be reasonable only when the
trigger is quite small5. Because only under such a condition,
fuzzing the input could suppress the trigger effect on hijacking
the prediction.
ConFoc. The ConFoc [135] enforces the model (clean or
backdoored) to focus on the content of the input image to
remove backdoor effects, while discarding the style informa-
tion potentially contaminated by the trigger. It produces true
label—not the attacker targeted label—of the trigger input that
is consistent with the input content, which at least retaining
the CDA given clean inputs as well. The rationale is that the
image consists of both content and style information [136].
The former refers to the shapes of the object or the semantic
information, while the later refers to the colors or texture
information of images. It is hypothesized that focusing on
content only is similar to human reasoning when making
classifications. Therefore, the ConFoc [135] retrains the model
to make classifications mainly relying on the content informa-
tion. One main limitation of the ConFoc is that it assumes
5The authors evaluate triggers covering at most 5 pixels [40] for MNIST
dataset. It is acknowledged that the certification [134] with similar concept
to [40] is only relatively effective for a trigger with no more than 2 pixels
tested for the same MNIST dataset.
the trigger does not overlap with the interested object—with
content information—in the input image, which is inapplicable
when setting triggers being overlapped with the object, e.g.,
those triggers in Fig. 4.
Notes. Blind backdoor removal does not tell backdoored
model from clean model. As we can see, fine-pruning usually
renders to CDA drop that could be unacceptable. Other works
suppress or remove trigger effect if the model is infected. But
we note that suppression make, somehow, unrealistic assump-
tion about the trigger size. As for ConFoc, it is only applicable
to certain tasks where the image consists of both content and
style information. Except fine-pruning, all other works are
inapplicable to other domains. They are all specifically devised
for vision domain.
B. Offline Inspection
Both backdoored model and trigger input (or poisoned data)
can be inspected offline. However, trigger input inspection is
only possible under data collection. For other attack
surfaces, it is very unlikely that the attacker will expose the
poisoned data to the defender.
1) Data Inspection: Data inspection assumes that the poi-
soned data are available for the defenders. Since the attacker
exploit data poisoning in order to insert backdoors.
Spectral Signature. Tran et al. [137] explore spectral sig-
nature, a technique based on (robust) statistic analysis, to
identify and remove poisoned data samples from a potentially
compromised training dataset. Firstly, a model is trained on
collected dataset that may be with poisoned data points.
Secondly, for each particular output class label, all the input
instances for that label are fed into the model, and their latent
representations are recorded. Thirdly, singular value decom-
position is performed on the covariance matrix of the latent
representations that are extracted e.g., from the penultimate
layer, which is used to compute an outlier score for each input.
Fourthly, the input sample with higher score than a ration is
flagged as trigger input, and removed from the training dataset
on which a clean model will be trained again. This defense
succeeds when the latent representations of clean inputs are
sufficiently different from that of trigger inputs. Therefore, a
crucial step is determining the means of obtaining proper latent
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representation that can expose the trace of the trigger [97].
However, it points out that the outlier ration is fixed to be
close to the ratio of corrupted samples in the target class.
This requires some knowledge of the poison ratio and target
class [138], [139], which turns to be unknown in practice.
One improvement with similar concept is studied, also by
exploiting clustering latent representations extracted from the
penultimate layer [139].
Gradient Clustering. Chan et al. [138] use cluster concept
in a slightly different means that is not clustering latent
representations. Chan et al. hypothesize and then show that a
trigger image sample could lead to a relatively large absolute
value of gradient in the input layer at the trigger position.
Based on this, trigger samples can be separated from clean
samples using clustering algorithm. As the authors can detect
the infected targeted and source classes, the infected model can
be retrained by relabeling the trigger samples to their correct
label to unlearn the backdoor effect, rather than training the
model from scratch using sanitized data that has removed the
corrupted data.
Activation Clustering. Chen et al. [140] propose an activa-
tion clustering (AC) method. It is noticed that activations of
last hidden layer reflect high level features used by the neural
network to reach model decision. Given the collected data
and the model trained with the data, each sample is fed into
the model, and the corresponding activation is collected. The
activations of inputs belonging to the same label are separated
and clustered by applying k-means clustering with k = 2 after
dimension reduction. Since the 2-means clustering will always
separate the activations into two clusters, regardless whether
poisoned data is present or not, some metric to judge is used.
For example, a high silhouette score means that the class
has been infected or poisoned. Once the poisoned data are
identified, they can be removed and a clean model is trained.
The other model restoration is to relabel the poisoned data to
their correct source label to retrain the backdoored model to
unlearn the backdoor effect, which could save time.
Deep k-NN. In [141], Peri et al. design a deep k-NN method
to detect clean-label poisoned samples, which is able to
effectively against both feature collision and convex polytope
clean-label attacks, see subsection IV-C. It demonstrates to
detect over 99% of poisoned examples in both clean-label
attacks over CIFAR-10 dataset, consequently, those detected
poisoned samples are removed without compromising model
performance. Particularly, it has been shown more robust
than l2-norm, one-class SVM and Random Point Eviction
defenses against Feature Collision Attack, while comparable
with l2-norm defense but remove less clean images in Convex
Polytope Attack.
SCAn. Unlike most countermeasures focus on class-agnostic
triggers, Tang et al. [142] propose statistical contamination
analyzer (SCAn), as a means of detecting both class-agnostic
and class-specific triggers, see subsection III-B. It decomposes
the latent representation of an image, in particular, the feature
from the last third layer or the layer before logits, into
two components: a class-specific identity, e.g., facial features
distinguishing one person from others in face recognition task
(that is between-class component), and a variation component,
e.g., size, orientation (within-class variation component). Then
it is hypothesized that the variation component of an input im-
age is independent of the label. This means the variation com-
ponent distribution learned from one label/class is transferable
to other labels. For example, smile as a variation component
in face recognition is dependent of individual’s identity—the
variation component is universal. Tang et al. [142] decompose
all images belonging to each class to obtain finer-grained
information—in comparison with e.g., the information gained
through simple activation clustering [140]—on trigger impacts
for classification. Using statistical analysis on the decomposed
components, it is noticed that the latent representation of
images in the attacker target class (infected class) is a mixture
of two groups from trigger inputs and clean inputs, because
each is decomposed into a distinct identity component and a
universal variation component. Recall that the trigger images
are from a different class/identity but (mis)labeled to the target
label. So that the infected class can be identified. The SCAn
has one additional main advantage that it also applicable to
class-specific triggers. As a slightly contradiction, it eventu-
ally assumes a small set of held clean validation set, must
contain no trigger, from in-house collection under this data
collection surface. Although this assumption might be
held in some cases. In addition, the SCAn is specific to image
classification tasks where a class label is given to each object
(face, flower, car, digits, traffic sign, etc.), and the variation
applied to an object (e.g., lighting, poses, expressions, etc.) is
of the same distribution across all labels. Such a criterion may
not be always satisfiable. Moreover, it is acknowledged [142]
that SCAn is less effective to multiple target-trigger attack,
see subsection III-B.
Differential Privacy. Du et al. propose a quite different
strategy that applies differential privacy when performing
model training to facilitate detect outliers [143]. Applying
differential privacy gains a trained model that is also named
as naturally smoothed model [45]. As poisoned data can
be viewed as outliers, so they can be detected through this
strategy. Differential privacy is a means of protecting data
privacy. It aims to hide certain input data information from the
output, so that one can not tell whether the input data contain
a certain record or not by looking at the result calculated from
input data. When differential privacy is applied to the machine
learning algorithm, the trained model becomes insensitive
to the removal or replacement of an arbitrary point in the
training dataset. More specifically, the contribution from rare
poisoned samples will be hidden by random noise added when
training the model, so that the model underfits or suppresses
the poisoned samples. This means the backdoor effect is
already greatly suppressed by the model—ASR is quite low. In
addition, the model will be less confident when predicting the
atypical poisoned examples. Therefore, by measuring the loss
as a metric, one can distinguish poisoned inputs, because it
has higher loss score. It is shown that this differential privacy
based backdoor countermeasure [143] can effectively suppress
backdoor effects as well as detect poisoned samples, even the
source-specific trigger inputs. As the validation is only through
the toy MNIST dataset, it is worth to further validate the
efficacy of this method with more complex dataseat trained
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by representative model architectures.
RAB. Weber et al. [45] propose a provably robust training
process for classifiers/models against backdoor attacks. Gen-
erally, it trains the model by applying the different privacy and
then exploiting randomized smoothing to mitigate the trigger
effects. It is provably robustness against backdoor attacks on
the condition that the trigger perturbation is bounded.
Notes: We can see that most of these countermeasures
are based on clustering algorithm applied on, e.g., latent
representation, gradient, and activation. We note that these
countermeasure may not be applicable for the special image-
scaling based backdoor attack under data collection
attack surface (see subsection IV-C). To defend such attack,
the parameters of downsamping filter can to be carefully
chosen during resizing to remove the image-scaling attack
effect [144]. For the other special clean-label poisoning attack
that is the targeted class data poisoning by only stamping
triggers on the data belonging to the targeted class [111], it is
unclear whether above data inspection methods are effective
or not. Because they assume the source class is different
target, violating the attack setting of [111] that source class
stamped with the trigger is same to target class. In addition,
most studies do not explicitly consider reporting results of,
e.g., false positive, when the dataset under examination is
eventually benign.
2) Model Inspection: Unlike data inspection that assumes
access to poisoned data. All countermeasures in this part use
more practical assumption for all attack surfaces except data
collection, where the poisoned data is not available.
Trigger Reverse Engineer. In Oakland 2019, Wang et al. [83]
propose the NeuralCleanse to detect whether a DNN model
has been backdoored or not prior to deployment, where the
performance is further improved in TABOR [49] by utilizing
various regularization when solving optimizations. The other
improvement with similar concept of NeuralCleanse is [51]
though the specific methods differs. Neural Cleanse is based
on the intuition that, given a backdoored model, it requires
much smaller modifications to all input samples to misclassify
them into the attacker targeted (infected) label than any other
uninfected labels. In other words, a shortest perturbation path
exists to any input to the target label. Therefore, NeuralCleanse
iterates through all labels of the model and determine if any
label requires a substantially smaller amount of modification
to achieve misclassifications. One advantage of this method is
that the trigger can be reverse-engineered and identified during
the backdoored model detection process. Once the trigger is
identified, backdoor removal (detailed in Section V-D) can be
performed via retraining to unlearn the trigger effect.
Despite its novelty, NeuralCleanse is still with some lim-
itations. Firstly, it could incur high computation costs pro-
portional to the number of labels. The computation cost of
detection process can take up to several days for certain DNN
models even when the optimization is considered. Secondly,
like most backdoor countermeasures, the method is reported
to be less effective with the increased trigger size. Thirdly, it
requires training reference models to determine a threshold to
distinguish clean and backdoored model, which inadvertently
appears to be inapplicable under outsourcing. Because this
violates the motivation of outsourcing where the user has
limited computational resource or/and ML expertise.
It is observed that the reversed trigger is not always con-
sistent with the original trigger [47], [145], e.g., in different
runs [145]. As a consequence, when the reversed trigger that
is inconsistent with the original trigger is utilized for backdoor
removal, the removal efficacy will be greatly decreased. That
is, the input with the original trigger still has considerable
attack success rate to the retrained model. Accordingly, Qiao
et al. [145] generatively model the valid trigger distribution,
rather than a single reversed trigger, via the max-entropy stair-
case approximator (MESA) and then use many valid triggers
to perform backdoor removal to increase the removal efficacy.
However, this work relies on several strong assumptions such
as knowledge of the model being backdoored, and shape and
size of the tirgger, which are not available in real-world to
defenders. In addition, validations in [145] are limited by a
small trigger, a 3 × 3-pixel square, where the computational
overhead of this work is not reported—could be quite high.
NeuronInspect. Under similar concept with SentiNet [37]
and Februus [132] exploiting output explanation, Huang et
al. [146] propose NeuronInspect to combine with outlier
detection considering that the explanation heatmap of attacker
target class—treated as outlier—differs from non-target class.
In other words, the heatmap for the target class is hypothe-
sised to be i) compact, ii) smooth and iii) remains persistent
even across different input images. The persistence is an
exhibition of the trigger input-agnostic characteristic. In com-
parison with NeuralCleanse, NeuronInspect has advantages
including reduced computational overhead and robustness
against multiple-trigger-to-same-label backdoor variant (V1 in
subsection III-B). However, unlike NeuralCleanse [83] and
TABOR [49], it does not reverse engineer and discover the
trigger.
DeepInspect. Chen et al. propose DeepInspect [116] to
detect backdoor attack with no requirement of accessing
training data. The key idea of DeepInspect is to use a condi-
tional generative model to learn the probabilistic distribution
of potential triggers. This generative model will be used
to generate reversed triggers whose their perturbation level
will be statistically evaluated to build the backdoor anomaly
detection. DeepInspect is faster than NeuralCleanse [83] to
reverse triggers in complex datasets. However, due to the
weak assumption of defender’s capability that has no access
to training data, the detection performance of DeepInspect
appears to be worse than NeuralCleanse.
AEGIS. Soremekun et al. [147], for the first time, investigate
the backdoor attacks on adversarial robust model that is elab-
orately trained defending against adversarial attacks [148]. It
is shown that adversarial robust model, robust model for short
in later description, is vulnerable to backdoor attacks, though
the robust model is robust against adversarial example attacks.
Correspondingly, they propose AEGIS, a method exploiting
latent feature clustering to specifically detect backdoored ro-
bust model. One exploited unique property of robust model is
that it can be adopted for image generation/synthesizing [148].
Therefore, for each class, the robust classifier itself is used
to generate synthesized images. Then latent features of both
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synthesized images and held-out validation images are ex-
tracted, followed by feature dimension reduction. After that
a clustering algorithm, namely shift algorithm [149], is used
to automate the detection process. If there are no more than
two clusters—one is distribution of the validation samples,
one is distribution of the synthesized images uninfected by
triggers, then this robust model is deemed as clean, otherwise
backdoored because now there are other distrubtions formed
by synthesized images infected by triggers. In fact, clustering
the sample latent representation is not new, which has been
used for trigger data inspection [140]. The difference is that
previous work [140] requires to access poisoned trigger data,
while AEGIS does not. The limitation of AEGIS is only
applicable for robust models, not standard models. It is also
acknowledged that defeating certain trigger, e.g., blending
trigger as in Fig. 4 (a), induced backdoor appears to be an
challenge for AEGIS.
Meta Classifier. Unlike above works dedicated to vision
domain, Xu et al. [150] consider a generic backdoor detection
applicable to diverse domains such as audio and text. It
trains many (e.g., 2048) clean and (e.g., 2048) backdoored
shadow models by the defender to act as training samples
of a meta-classifer—the other neural network—to predict
whether a new model is clean or not. Note that the shadow
model sometimes is sometimes called as surrogate model. To
approximate the general distribution of backdoored models,
the shadow backdoored models are trained over diverse trigger
patterns and backdoor goals. To generate feature input to
the meta-classifier, a number of query inputs are made to
each shadow model and confidence score from the shadow
model are concatenated, acting as feature representation of the
shadow model, while the output of the meta-classifier is binary.
The query inputs—number of ten is used [150]—are further
optimized along with the training of the meta-classier, rather
than randomly selected to gain accurate feature representation
of the shadow model [150]. This method has advantage of its
generalization across different domains. It is worth to mention
that adaptive attacks are specifically considered by the authors
to evaluate the defense robustness. However, this methods
requires both ML expertise and expensive computational re-
sources, which might be less practical.
Universal Litmus Pattern. Colouri et al. [151] apply similar
concept as above [150] to train a meta-classifier. Like [150], a
small set of specifically chosen image inputs, here namely,
universal litmus patterns [151], query the clean and back-
doored shadow models, then the logits (from the penultimate
layer) are concatenated as feature input to the meta-classier,
whether the model is clean or backdoored is the output of
the meta-classifer. The universal litmus patterns are crafted
with assistance of the technique in [83]. When a new model
is coming, these universal litmus patterns are fed into it and
collects the logits of the new model, as a feature to the
meta-classifier to tell whether this new model is backdoored
or not. Both [150] and [151] require train enormous clean
and backdoored models as prerequisites, the cost is high.
This is worsen considering that the meta-classifier is dataset
dependent. For example, if the meta-classifier is for CIFAR10,
a new model trained over MNIST cannot be distinguished by
this meta-classifier. Therefore, such computational expensive
shadow model training have to be performed when dataset
changes. In addition, in comparison with [151] that is general-
ize to diverse domains, the universal litmus pattern is specific
to image inputs. Moreover, the efficacy of universal litmus
pattern [150] is achieved with a strong assumption: the trigger
size is inexplicitly assumed to be known.
Notes. As the defender is with less capability, in partic-
ular, no access to poisoned samples, it is unsurprising that
offline model inspection usually requires high computational
overhead and ML expertise. In this context, defenders un-
der outsourcing and pretrained may not be able to
adopt these countermeasures. Because they are usually lack
of computational resources or/and ML expertise. Most of
countermeasures here can not deal with large size trigger,
especially for countermeasures that are aiming to reverse
engineer the trigger.
C. Online Inspection
Online inspection can also be applied to monitor either the
model or input data behaviour during run-time.
1) Data Inspection: Data inspection check the coming
input to decide whether a trigger is contained or not through
anomaly detection, thus, denying the adversarial input and then
throwing alert if set.
SentiNet. In 2018, Chou et al. [37] exploit both the model
interpretability/explanation and object detection techniques,
referred to as SentiNet, to firstly discover contiguous regions
of an input image important for determining the classification
result. This region is assumed having a high chance of
possessing a trigger when it strongly affects the classification.
Once this region is determined, it is carved out and patched
on to other held-out images that are with ground-truth labels.
If both the misclassification rate—probability of the predicted
label is not the ground-truth label of the held-out image—
and confidence of these patched images are high enough, this
carved patch is regarded as an adversarial patch that contains a
backdoor trigger. Therefore, the incoming input is a backdoor
input.
NEO. Udeshi et al. [152] proposed NEO that is devised to
search and then mitigate the trigger by the dominant color
in the image frame when it appears in the scene at run-time.
The method is claimed to be fast and completely black-box
to isolate and reconstruct the trigger for defenders to verify
on a skeptical model. However, by occluding the trigger with
the dominant color, the method is not robust against large
trigger, and the classification accuracy after NEO method is
also degraded since the main feature is sometimes occluded.
In addition, the validation is only performed via trigger that
is with square shape, which is not generalized.
STRIP. In 2019 ACSAC, Gao et al. [84] propose STRIP.
They turn the input-agnostic strength of the trigger into a
weakness exploited to detect the poisoned input. If a model
has been backdoored. On one hand, for a clean input, the
prediction z should be quite different from the ground-truth
given strong intentional perturbation is applied to it. Therefore,
replicas of a clean input with varying perturbation exhibit
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strong randomness—quantified via the entropy metric. On
the other hand, for trigger inputs, the prediction z should
be usually constant to the attacker’s target za even under
perturbations because of the strong hijacking effect of the
trigger. Therefore, replicas of the trigger input with varying
perturbation exhibit weak randomness. Given a preset entropy
threshold—can be determined solely using clean input, the
trigger input (high entropy) can be easily distinguished from
the clean input (low entropy), consequently, throwing alert for
further investigations. The STRIP is simple to use that is a
non-ML method, yet efficient and generic that is validated to
not only vision domain, but also text and audio [16]. It is
robust against arbitrary triggers, e.g., any size—this is always
a limitation for most countermeasures [37], [49], [83], [145].
One limitation is that it is mainly designed for class-agnostic
triggers, thus, is not efficient for class-specific triggers.
Epistemic Classifier. Yang et al. [153] propose epistemic
classifier to leverage whether the prediction of an input is re-
liable or not to identify inputs containing triggers—adversarial
input is unreliable. The concept is similar to [154]. Generally,
an input is compared to its neighboring training points—
determined online—according to certain distance metric that
separates them in the latent representations across multiple
layers. The labels of these searched neighboring training points
in each hidden layer are used to check whether that the
intermediate computations performed by each layer remain
conformal with the final model’s prediction. If they are incon-
sistent, the prediction of input is deemed as unreliable, which
is an trigger input, otherwise, clean input. More generally, it
is based on the hypothesis that input with trigger might start
close to a clean training instance—from the source class—
in input layer, but its trajectory over the neural network will
slowly or abruptly close to the attacker’s chosen targeted class.
This concept is similar to NIC [155]. Such abnormal deviation
can be reflected by observing the consistency of the labels
of input’s neighboring training points across multiple layers.
Though this work [153] is insensitive to trigger shapes, sizes,
it results into high computational overhead when the model is
with large convolutional layers or/and dataset is large, which
is problematic especially considering that it acts as an online
backdoor detection approach.
2) Model Inspection: Model inspection [155], [156] re-
lies on anomaly technique to distinguish model abnormal
behaviour resulted from backdoor.
ABS. In 2019 CCS, Liu et al. propose Artificial Brain Stim-
ulation (ABS) [156] by scanning a DNN model to determine
whether it is backdoored. Inspiring from the Electrical Brain
Stimulation (EBS) technique used to analyze the human brain
neurons, Liu et al. use ABS to inspect individual neuron acti-
vation difference for anomaly detection of backdoor, this can
potentially defeat backdoor attack on sequential models [95]
beyond classification tasks. Some advantages of ABS are that
i) it is trigger size independent, and ii) requires only one clean
training input per label to detect the backdoor. iii) It can also
detect backdoor attacks on feature space rather besides pixel
space. Nevertheless, the method appears to be only effective
under certain critical assumptions, e.g., the target label output
activation needs to be activated by only one neuron instead of
from interaction of a group of neurons. Thus, it can be easily
bypassed by using a spread trigger like the one in Fig 4 (b)
(see Section 5.2 in [47]). In addition, the scope is also limited
to the attack of one single trigger per label. If multiple triggers
were aimed to attack the same label, it would be out of ABS’s
reach.
NIC. In 2019 NDSS, Ma et al. propose NIC [155] by check-
ing the provenance channel and activation value distribution
channel. They extract DNN invariants and use them to perform
run-time adversarial sample detection including trigger input
detection. This method can be generally viewed to check the
activation distribution and flow across DNN layers—inspired
by the control flow used in programming—to determine
whether the flow is violated due to the adversarial samples.
However, NIC indeed requires extensive offline training to
gain different classifiers across layers to check the activation
distribution and flow and can be easily evaded by adaptive
attacks [155].
Notes: It is worth to mention that online inspection indeed
require some preparations performed offline, for example, de-
termining a threshold to distinguish the trigger behavior from
clean inputs. However, the threshold is determined solely by
clean inputs. One advantage of online inspection is that some
countermeasures [84], [155] are insensitive to trigger size.
In addition, online inspection countermeasures [84], [153],
[155], [156] has, to some extent, good generalization to diverse
domains. One limitation is that the online inspection often
results in latency, therefore, the online detection should be fast
to be applicable to real-time application such as self-driving.
D. Post Backdoor Removal
Once backdoor, either via model inspection or data in-
spection, is detected, backdoor removal can be taken into
consideration. One way is to remove the corrupted inputs
and train the model again [137], [140], which appears to be
only practical under data collection as the user is not
allowed to access trigger inputs under other attack surfaces.
The other way is to unclearn the backdoor behaviour
by retraining or fine-tuning the backdoored model using
corrupted data comprising the trigger but labeled correctly,
which relearns the corrected decision boundaries [47], [138].
In this context, the crux is to reverse engineer the origi-
nal trigger precisely and identify the infected target label.
NeuralCleanse [83] is a representative of this kind, however,
the reverse-engineered trigger often fails to be the original
trigger [47], [145], which renders inefficiency of lowering
the ASR of the corrected backdoored model. The ASR of
the corrected model could be still high e.g., around 50% in
worst case (on CIFAR10 and the original trigger with size
of 3 × 3 and simply back-white pattern), given the poisoned
input [145].
Qiao et al. [145] recognize that the reversed trigger follows
a distribution instead of a single point, so that a number of
valid triggers under the trigger distribution space are used
to combine with clean data to retrain the backdoored model.
Here, these valid triggers are reversed from the orignial trigger
but is different from the original trigger. However, they are still
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Table II: Backdoor countermeasures summary and comparison.
Categorization Work ModelAccess
Domain
Generalization1
Poisoned
Data Access
Validation
Data Access
Computational
Resource
ML
Expertise
Global
Reference V1 V2 V3 V4 V5
Blind
Backdoor
Removal
Fine-Pruning
2018 [131]2 White-Box G# #  Medium High G#      
Februus
2019 [132] White-Box # #  Medium High #    G# G#
Suppression
2020 [40] 3 Black-Box # #  Low Medium #   G#  —4
Certification
2020 [134] Black-Box # #  Low Medium #   #  —
ConFoc
2020 [135] White-Box # #  Medium High #    G# G#
Offline
Data
Inspection
Spectral
Signature
2018 [137]
White-Box    Medium Medium       
Activation
Clustering
2018 [140]
White-Box    Medium Medium      #[142]
Gradient
Clustering
2019 [138]
White-Box    Medium Medium #      
Differential
Privacy
2019 [143]
White-Box    Medium Medium #      
RAB
(Certification)
2020 [45]
White-Box    Medium High #   # G#  
SCAn
2019 [142] White-Box G#   Medium Medium   G#    
Offline
Model
Inspection
Neural
Cleanse
2019 [83]
Black-Box # #  High High  # G# #  #[142]
TABOR
2019 [49] 5 Black-Box # #  High High  # G# #  #
Xiang et al.
2019 [51] 5 Black-Box # #  High High  #  #   
DeepInspect
2019 [116] Black-Box # # # High High # # G# #  #
NeuronInspect
2019 [146] White-Box # #  High High  #  #  #
AEGIS
2020 [147] White-Box # #  Medium High #   G#  —
Meta
Classifier
2019 [150]
Black-Box  #  VeryHigh High      G#
Universal
Litmus
Pattern
2020 [151]
White-Box # #  VeryHigh High  # G# #  #
Online
Input
Inspection
SentiNet
2018 [37] White-Box # #  Low Medium #   G#  #[142]
NEO
2019 [152] Black-Box # #  Medium Medium #   #  —
STRIP
2019 [84] Black-Box  #  Low NO #     #[142]
Epistemic
Classifier
2020 [153] 6
White-Box G# #  High Medium #      
NNoculation
2020 [47] White-Box # #  High High G#     G#
Online
Model
Inspection
ABS
2019 [156] White-Box G# # G# High High  #  #7  #[40]
NIC
2019 [155] White-Box G# #  High High #      
 : Applicable or Necessary. #: Inapplicable or Unnecessary. G#: Partially Applicable or Necessary.
V1: Multiple Triggers to Same Label. V2: Multiple Triggers to Multiple Labels. V3: Trigger Size, Shape and Position. V4: Trigger Transparency. V5:
Class-specific Trigger. See detailed descriptions about V1-V5 in Section III-B.
1 Most defenses are specifically designed for vision domain, which may not be applicable to other domains such as audio and text.
2 Fine-pruning is performed without firstly checking whether the model is backdoored or not, which could greatly deteriorate CDA both clean and
backdoored models.
3 This work [40] is only suitable for very small trigger.
4 — means such information is neither inexplicitly (hard to infer according to the work description) nor explicitly unavailable.
5 TABOR is an improvement over NeuralCleanse improve the reverse engineered trigger accuracy. While [51] share similar concept NeuralClease though
the specific method differs.
6 This work [153] becomes impractical to models with large convolutional layers or/and large dataset, especially as an online model inspection approach.
7 It is shown that ABS is sensitive to the shape of triggers, e.g., spread or distributed triggers [47].
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able to achieve the orignial trigger effect, in certain cases. The
corrected model exhibits a better backdoor removal efficacy—
ASR is greatly reduced to 9.1% in worst case (on CIFAR10
and the original trigger with size of 3 × 3 and simply back-
white pattern). However, the critical limitation of this work
is it assumes the knowledge of the model being backdoored,
even trigger size and fixed shape, which are less realistic
in practice. In addition, it is unclear whether this method is
(computationally) feasible for larger size triggers with complex
patterns, e.g., not only black and white pixels.
The NNoculation [47] relaxes the assumption of back-
door triggers. To correct the backdoored model, it has two
phases: pre-deployment and post-deployment phases. The pre-
deployment retrains the (backdoored) DNN model FΘbd us-
ing an augmented dataset consisting of clean samples and
noisy version of clean samples—random noises are added
to the clean samples. The later noisy samples are attempt-
ing to approximately approach the poisoned data. The pre-
deployment therefore constructs an augmented backdoored
model FΘaug , which could reduce the ASR of the attacker.
In post-deployment, any input will be fed into both FΘbd and
FΘaug , and the input is rejected and then isolated/quarantined
on the condition that the predictions between FΘbd and FΘaug
mismatch. In other words, some trigger inputs are misclas-
sified by the FΘbd to the attacker chosen class, but are still
correctly classified by the FΘaug to their ground-truth classes.
The quarantined data are more likely including the attacker’s
trigger instances. Once a number of quarantined instances are
collected, the defenders trains a CycleGAN 6 that is used
to transform between clean inputs and poisoned inputs—the
CycleGAN learns to stamp triggers to clean inputs. By using
those generated poisoned images and their corrected labels,
the defender can retrain the FΘbd to reduce the likelihood
of effectiveness of the actual backdoor. There are several
limitations of this work. Firstly, like NeuralCleanse, it is
mainly applicable for images domain and could result in
high computational cost. Secondly, it requires professional ML
expertise. Thirdly, the selection criteria, e.g., the number of
quarantined samples required, are mostly empirically based.
Inadvertently, the trigger input is more likely to successfully
bypass the system at early deployment stage as this system
needs to capture a number of quarantined data. Moreover, it
is not always stable [40].
E. Discussion and Summary
Table II compares different countermeasures. It is under
expectation that none of them is able to defend all backdoor at-
tacks, all with their own limitations. For examples, Activation
clustering [140], spectral signature [137] and SCAn [142] are
offline data inspection method and assume access to the trigger
inputs, therefore, it is only applicable to data collection
attacks. For NeuralCleanse [83] and TABOR [49] that re-
verse engineering the trigger, besides the acknowledged high
computational cost and only work for small trigger size [83],
they cannot be applied to binary classification tasks such as
6The CycleGAN [157] performs image-to-image transformation, where
images from one distribution are transformed into another image distribution.
malware detection—classes shall be higher than two [150].
The computational cost could be quite high when the number
of classes is large.
Most countermeasures need access to a (small) set of valida-
tion data that contains no trigger, which renders difficult under
collaborative learning attacks. It is also noticeable
that some countermeasures rely on global reference—in most
cases, training shadow models—to determine a threshold to
distinguish whether the model is clean. This results into
two inadvertent limitations: the global threshold cloud be
unreliable to some unique tasks; obtaining this global reference
could require high computational resources, e.g., to train
(many) shadow models or/and ML expertise. The latter appears
to be cumbersome against outsource and pretrained
attacks, where the defender are usually limited by computa-
tional resource or/and ML expertise. Therefore, it is important
to consider the defender’s resources— [150], [151] otherwise
requires training a large number of shadow models by the
defender. When devising countermeasures, assumptions should
be made reasonable— [145], [150] otherwise assumes the
trigger size is known. For online inspection, it is worth to
mention again that it does require preliminary offline prepa-
ration. In addition, it is imperative to reduce the detection
latency, as online inspection is performed during run-time, to
be mountable for real-time applications.
All of the backdoor countermeasures are empirically based
except two concurrent provable works [45], [134] that both uti-
lize randomized smoothing—a certification technique. How-
ever, the limitation of certification is that it always assumes (lp-
norm) bounded perturbation of the trigger. Such assumption
is not always held for backdoor triggers. The trigger can be
perceptible that is unbounded but still inconspicuous.
It is worth to mention that several countermeasures against
backdoor attack is applicable to defend other adversarial
attacks. In fact, backdoor attack is akin to UAP; hence, defend-
ing against the backdoor attack will likely to defend against the
UAP. the SentiNet [37] has shown that their defending method
could be generalized to both backdoor attack and UAP. The
NIC [155] also shows that it is effective against UAP.
We also recommend the defense studies explicitly identify
threat models and clearly clarify the defender’s capability. It
is better state which attack surface(s) the study aim(s). In
addition, it is encouraged the defense always take backdoor
variants into consideration, as well as adaptive attacks if
possible—we do recognize that defending adaptive attack
appears to be open challenge.
VI. FLIP SIDE OF BACKDOOR ATTACK
As a matter of fact, every coin has two sides. From the flip
side, backdoor enables a number of positive applications.
A. Watermarking
Watermarking of DNN models leverages the massive over-
capacity of these models and their ability to fit data with
arbitrary labels [158]. There are current works considering
backdoor as a watermark to protect the intellectual property
(IP) of a trained DNN model [159]–[164]. The argument
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is that the inserted backdoor can be used to claim the
ownership of the model provider since only the provider is
supposed to have the knowledge of such a backdoor, while the
backdoored DNN model has no (or imperceptible) degraded
functional performance on normal inputs. Though there are
various countermeasures—detection, recovery, and removal—
against backdoor insertion, we conjecture that the watermark
using backdoor technique could be often robust. The rationale
is that it is very challenge to develop one-to-all backdoor
countermeasures. But we do recommend that careful backdoor
insertion strategy should be always considered to watermark
the model, especially taking the adaptive backdoor insertion
into consideration. It is feasible to utilize backdoor as a
information hiding technique [17] or stenography technqiue.
B. Against Model Extraction
Jia et al. [165] propose Entangled Watermarking Embed-
dings (EWE) to defend against model extraction attack [166].
The EWE is an extension of the watermarking but with
differing application scenario. Here, the attacker aims to steal
the models provided by vendor, e.g., machine learning as
a service (mlaas), using model extraction attack, generally
relying on querying the victim model and observing the
returned response, e.g., softmax. Then the attacker do not need
to pay the victim model provider for further queries, because
the stolen model has comparable accuracy of the victim model.
The attacker may also seek to make profit by publishing the
stolen model to the public. The EWE identifies the overfitting
weakness of the traditional watermaking method, and proposes
a method to jointly learn how to classify samples from the
main task distribution and watermarks (sub-task) on vision
and audio datasets. In other words, the stolen model will
inherent the backdoor inserted by the model provider. The
advantage of EWE lies on its moderate cost. In addition, it is
challenge to remove the backdoor by the attacker, unless the
attacker is willing to inevitably sacrifice the CDA performance
on legitimate data. Moreover, the EWE is designed in a
way to claim the ownership of the model provider with high
confidence in just a few (remote) queries.
C. Catch Adversarial Example
Shan et al. [167] exploit the backdoor as an intentionally
designed ‘trapdoor’ or ‘honeypot’ to catch/trap an attacker to
craft adversarial examples that will fall in the trapdoor, then be
captured. This method is fundamentally different from previ-
ous countermeasures against adversarial examples that neither
tries to patch nor disguise vulnerable points in the manifold.
Overall, trapdoors or backdoors are proactively inserted into
the models. At the same same, the neuron activation signatures
corresponding to trapdoors are extracted. When the attacker
attepmts to craft adversarial examples, e.g., by the state-of-the-
art attacks, usually relying on optimization, these optimization
algorithms will toward trapdoors, leading them to produce
attacks similar to trapdoors in the feature space. Therefore,
the adversarial examples can be detected with high detection
success rate and negligible impact on normal inputs—does
not impact normal classification performance. The advantage
of the defender now is that adversarial attacks are more
predictable because they converge to a known region (known
weakness of the model that is the trapdoor) and are thus easier
to detect. This method is easy to implement by simply implant
backdoor into the the model before deployment, the attacker
will have little choice but to produce the “trapped” adversarial
examples even in the white-box setting. This strategy could
be applicable to trap universal adversarial patch.
VII. DISCUSSION AND PROSPECT
A. Artifact Release
Recently, there is a trend of encouraging artifacts release,
e.g., source code or tools, to facilitate the reproduction of each
study. Fortunately, most studies follow such a a good practice,
and the link is attached in each corresponding reference given
that the artifacts are released—most of them are released at
Github. It is encouraged that following works in this research
line always well document and publish their artifacts. There
are efforts to encapsulate different works into a toolbox [168],
[169] to ease the rapid adoption and facilitate understanding.
It is worth to highlight that, now, there is an organized online
backdoor detection competition https://pages.nist.gov/trojai/.
B. Adaptive Attack
We conjecture that, akin to adversarial examples, there
will be a continuous security-race for backdoor attacks. New
devised empirical countermeasures against backdoor attacks
will be soon broken by strong adaptive backdoor attacks
when the attacker is aware of the defense. In this case, it
is not hard to bypass the defense, which has been shown
by simply taking the evasion of defenses such as spectral
signature [137], activation clustering [140], STRIP [84], and
NeuralCleanse [83] as objectives into the loss function when
inserting the backdoor to the model [11], [56], [79], [100].
Though defenses can increase the cost paid by the attack-
ers, fundamentally preventing backdoor attacks is regarded a
daunting problem.
C. Triggers
According to summary in Table II, it is observed that
most countermeasures are ineffective to detect large size
triggers or/and class-specific triggers, which demand more
defense efforts. To facilitate backdoor insertion such as data
poisoning under data collection [99] as well as attack
phase. The trigger can be crafted adaptively as long as the
their latent representation are similar. In other words, the
triggers do not have to be universal, e.g., same visually. For
instances, imperceptible triggers are used to poison the data
while perceptible trigger is used during attack to increase the
attack robustness [108]; graph triggers are adaptively tailored
according to the input graph, thereby optimizing both attack
effectiveness and evasiveness on backdoored graph neural
networks [99]. Dynamic triggers are effective regardless of
location, visualization variations [93], [94].
It is obvious that one most advantage of backdoor is the
arbitrary chosen trigger, e.g., in comparison with adversarial
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example attacks, which is fully under the control the attacker.
Therefore, the triggers can be optimally identified or chosen
to facilitate the attack, especially survive various variations in
the physical attack [38]. In fact, various natural triggers can
be exploited including natural accessory triggers [39], facial
expression [40], natural reflection phenomena [112].
D. Passive Attack
It maybe a commonality that the backdoor attacker need
modify both the training data and testing data by inserting the
trigger in the input. This means the trigger has to be actively
added to the input during the attacking phase. In other words,
the attacker performs the backdoor attack actively. However,
the attacker could select some trigger to carry out passive
attack, referred as a different term of semantic backdoors [71].
For example, a red hat as trigger for objection detector. Then
the victim could be some pedestrians who accidentally wears
a red hat. The backdoored self-driving car will ignore their
existence and causes casualties. These victims are innocent
personal targeted by the attacker. The other case is when the
trigger is some words, whenever the trigger is shown in a
review, the review will be classified to as negative regardless
the real comments. In these attack phase, there is no need to
actively modify the trigger input by the attacker. But rather
the trigger input is passive.
E. Defense Generalization
As a matter of fact, most countermeasures are explicitly or
inexplicitly designed or/and have been mainly focusing on or
tailored for vision domain in terms of classification task, see
summary in Table II. There are lack of generic countermea-
sures that are demonstrated to be effective across different do-
mains such as vision, audio and text. Since all of these domains
have been infected by backdoor attacks. In addition, backdoor
attacks on other than classification tasks such as sequential
model or reinforcement learning [21], [95], [96], [170], deep
neural graph model [99], deep generative model [20], source
processing [58], [97] also solicit defenses for which current
countermeasures focusing on (image) classification task may
not be directly applicable [96]. It is recommended that the
defense studies clearly clarify the generalization when devising
a countermeasure.
F. Defender Capability
It is important to develop suitable defenses for users under
given threat models, it is very challenge that one defense
could counter attacks under all threats. In this context, the
defense development should consider the users capability.
For example, under outsourcing, the users usually have
neither ML expertise nor rich computational resources, it is
wisely to avoid reliance on reference model, especially those
require heavy computational resources and ML expertise.
Even in transfer learning that is affected by pretrained
attack surface, the users are always limited with massive GPU
clusters when they expedite build accurate models customized
to their own scenario, thus, computational heavy defenses
could be unsuitable. In addition, some defenses are with strong
assumptions such as the knowledge of trigger size [145],
[151] or require extensively auxiliary model training [150],
[151], which appear to be impractical or/and too computational
expensive.
However, we do recognize that defenders are with harder
tasks and appreciate more studies on this side with reasonable
assumptions and acceptable efficacy.
G. In-House Development
As explicitly suggested [171], it is a necessity of develop-
ing critical security applications by reliable suppliers. Model
training and testing as well as data collection and validation
shall be performed by the system providers directly and then
maintained securely. As such, all threats to backdoor attacks
can be extremely avoided, if not all can be ruled out, because
the backdoor attack does usually require to tamper the training
data or/and model at any context by the attacker. As a compari-
son, other forms of adversarial attacks in particular adversarial
example only needs to tamper the fed input during deployment
that is usually out of the control of the system owner/provider,
where this in-house application development may become
cumbersome. Therefore, the practice of enforcing in-house
application will be very useful to reduce attack surfaces for
backdoor attacks, especially on critical infrastructures, if it
cannot eschew all.
H. Majority Vote
Unlike the adversarial examples that are transferable among
models, backdoor attack has no such advantage. This is
because the model needs to be firstly tampered to insert a
backdoor. Therefore, it is worth to consider majority vote
decision where several models are used to collaboratively
make decisions. The decision will only be accepted when they
are same or meeting with majority decision criterion. To do so,
the models are obtained from different sources. To be precise,
for outsourcing, the user can outsource the model training
to non-colluding parties, e.g., Microsoft and Google. Even
both of them will return backdoored models, it is extremely
unlikely that they will chose the same trigger. This is also the
case for the pretrained models. The users can randomly chose
pretrained models from different sources to perform transfer
learning. Similarly, it is extremely unlikely the attacker will
insert same trigger to all of them. In comparison with in-house
development, we regard majority decision as a more practical
strategy against backdoor attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work has timely provided a systematic and com-
prehensive review of the backdoor research line. For each
of backdoor attack and countermeasure categorization, we
highlight some facts that can be considered in following works.
As the countermeasure is far behind defense, more efforts
are solicited. It is wise to avoid less realistic or practical
assumptions as analysed and highlighted in this review when
devising countermeasures. Prospect research directions are
also discussed.
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